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COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE:                       
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property is at the center of the “new economy.” New 
economy products are characterized by declining average costs over a range 
of outputs, high rates of innovation, and network effects.1 Classically, 
intellectual property is one element among many in a production process 
adding to the value of a firm via licensing for competent exploitation of IP 
rights, cost reductions, R&D investment, and new products.2 Cumulative 
innovation proceeds as innovators build on each other’s discoveries. 
A vital target of IP law is to reward innovation and creation, by granting 
exclusive rights to use a new invention, information or a cultural good. The 
legal system induces the economic system, and legal norms must be assessed 
in ways that lead to the best outcome.3 The return from intellectual property 
rights is directly correlated to the duration and scope of those rights. 
Copyright offers authors a legal instrument that reimburses them for 
their creative works. Copyrights are not absolute, and a copyright holder 
never has complete control over all probable uses of his work. A copyright 
is the right given to creators for their literary or artistic works, encompassing 
mediums such as books and e-books, plays, newspapers, computer programs, 
databases, films, musical compositions, paintings, photographs, sculpture, 
architecture, advertisements and maps. Copyright does not embrace ideas, 
processes or procedures, mathematical concepts or methods of operation. 
Similarly, IP rights make digital goods legally exclusive as well. The 
protection obtainable by copyright is only for the expression of the work. 
 
*  Advocate and Economist. BSc (Econ) Aristotle University, JD Democritus University, LLM, PhD 
(Law) University of Hull, PhD (Econ) University of Peloponnese. The author may be contacted by email 
at zekosg@uop.gr or zekosg@yahoo.com. 
 1. GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, MNE’S IN 21ST CENTURY (2016); GEORGIOS. I. ZEKOS, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF IPRS (2016); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 
926 (2001). 
 2.  Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 
2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (2011) (“[T]he purpose of copyright is to enable the provision of capital 
and organization so that creative work may be exploited.”) 
 3.  R. H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 715 (1992). 
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The goal of copyright law is to preclude the unlawful use or piracy of any 
literary or artistic work by a third party. Works that are not protected by 
copyright law therefore belong to the public. 
Trademark law allows consumers, in the marketplace, to swiftly 
identify a product they liked or disliked in the past. Therefore, trademarks 
allow companies and consumers to distinguish among the different 
competing manufacturers of a given product. No one is entitled to sell or 
deliver commodities under the appearance that the commodities derive from 
someone else. The importance of consumer protection cannot be over-
emphasized, and the average consumer standard should remain the central 
point of the inquiry, even for domain name litigation. Trademark protection 
promotes three main policies: (1) protection of the trademark holder’s 
goodwill, (2) protection of the consumer, and (3) economic efficiency. 
Goodwill should be protected to the extent needed to prevent the unjust 
enrichment of a competitor. When there is no confusion at the time the user 
clicks on the advertisement or web-link, it does not lead to unjust enrichment. 
Fair use is a defense to trademark infringement, and one example of fair use 
is comparative advertising. Trademark protection, while constituting a vital 
instrument to make certain markets transparent, must be reconciled with 
other principal values including free expression, by enhancing consumer 
information and consumer preference, and free competition, averting 
needless barriers of entry in the market.4 
The TRIPS Agreement includes a set of minimum principles for IP 
rights protection and calls for all member countries to use the most-favored-
nation principle in IP protection. Nevertheless, IP rights protection is 
currently not close to harmonization across nations, and the TRIPS 
Agreement failed to harmonize standards of protection among intellectual 
property systems. The TRIPS Agreement does, however, include Article 10,5 
which describes computer programs and compilations of data, as well as 
Article 11,6 which tackles the rights of authors and their successors in title to 
allow or prevent others from commercially renting their copyrighted works. 
WIPO further states that copyrights exist “to encourage a dynamic creative 
culture, while returning value to creators so that they can lead a dignified 
 
 4.  See Georgios I. Zekos, Trademarks and Cyberspace, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 496 (2006), 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1422-2213.2006.00301.x/epdf.	
 5.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 10, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 6.  TRIPS Agreement art. 11. 
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economic existence, and to provide widespread, affordable access to content 
for the public.”7 Therefore, the environment of intellectual property has 
rapidly altered over the past two decades. With the advent of cyberspace, 
people have transformed the way they share information and consume 
intellectual property. As a result, it has become easier than ever for people 
around the globe to misappropriate protected material. 
The goal of this Article is to illustrate the developments in copyright 
and trademark law due to globalization and cyberspace. These developments 
will be illustrated by using theory and practice to point toward a tentative 
relationship between IP rights protection and the distribution of foreign 
direct investment (“FDI”) across jurisdictions. Moreover, this Article 
investigates and provides an answer regarding the ultimate impact of 
copyrights and trademarks on FDI inflows by employing the zekcopy6 and 
zekmark6 indices. 
II.  COPYRIGHT LAW 
A.  The Background of Copyright 
Copyright applies to any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.8 It protects the mode in which an author articulates 
an idea or a set of facts, but not the idea or facts themselves.9 Furthermore, 
copyright applies to an original work of authorship, fixed in a tangible 
medium embodiment embracing body language, facial expression, and 
reactions to other actors and elements of a scene. 
Only the creative expression in a work is protected by copyright; 
copyright does not protect functional matter.10 While software can obtain 
copyright protection as a literary work,11 courts tend to give it a thin level of 
protection.12 For example, in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., the Federal 
Circuit held that the application programming interfaces of the Java 
programming language were copyrightable expression, as opposed to non-
copyrightable functional matter.13 
 
 7.  Copyright and Related Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en. 
 8.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2015). 
 9.  2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:31 (Mar. 2016). 
 10.  17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2015). 
 11.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
 12.  See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 13.  750 F.3d at 1368, 1381. 
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Regarding the rebroadcasting of television programs, the Supreme 
Court held that doing so infringes the public performance right, even when 
technology is used that effectively gives each viewer a personal antenna.14 
This is because Congress added the definition of “public performance,” 
called the Transmit Clause, to the copyright statute to cover not only an 
initial showing, but also the rebroadcasting of any copyrighted content.15 
Notably, in Cartoon Network LP, v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the court held that 
there was no public performance of the work where customers of 
Cablevision used remote storage offered by Cablevision to record programs 
and watch them at their leisure, because the recording system “would not 
directly infringe [the copyright owners’] exclusive rights to reproduce and 
publicly perform their copyrighted works.”16 
Copyright applies to written works, and a wide series of creative works, 
including sculptures, photographs, maps, and computer software. Anyone 
who contributes to a work, such as an actor in a film, enjoys a separate, 
personal copyright.17 Copyright also allows for compilation works, which 
protect the order and way of presenting the compilation’s elements. 
However, compilation works do not extend to the elements themselves.18 
Copyright protection also does not extend to systems, procedures, and 
methods of operation. Systems and procedures are not only analogous to 
underlying ideas and formulas, but are also within the purview of patent law. 
Granting copyrights to systems, procedures and methods of operations could 
develop a backdoor method for obtaining copyrights for ideas incapable of 
receiving protection through the more rigorous patent law. With this in mind, 
an author’s description of the procedure may be copyrighted, but not the 
procedure itself.19 
Under modern copyright law, an author is not required to take any 
affirmative steps for copyright to accrue; copyright attaches from the 
 
 14.  ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 15.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 16.  536 F. 3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 17.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 18.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). Copyright also protects a compilation work, which is defined as “a 
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of 
authorship.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[C]opyright assures 
authors the right to their original expression . . . .”). 
 19.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015) (noting that copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated or embodied”); Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 468 
(2d Cir. 2002); SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2005). 
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moment of fixation in a tangible medium. Consequently, everything that has 
been written down, from a novel to an email and everything in between, 
allows the author to have a copyright, presuming that the writing is an 
original work exhibiting a minimal degree of creativity. 
Copyright also allows free communication of facts, while still 
protecting an author’s expression. This means that every idea, theory and 
fact in a copyrighted work becomes immediately offered for public 
exploitation at the moment of publication.20 
However, copyright can also hamper creators. While the grant of 
exclusive rights incentivizes some to create new information, it restricts 
others’ capacity to employ that information as raw material for a new 
expression following up on the previous material.  Proprietary information 
is also burdensome to lawfully appropriate, since copyright owners can 
charge any licensing fee they desire, or even decline to license their work 
altogether.21 Protection for intellectual property is provided in the interests 
of encouraging innovation and creativity. The U.S. intellectual property 
system is focused on creating optimal incentives that will promote 
innovation and creativity.22 Ownership of the right grants the author, or the 
author’s exclusive licensee, an exclusive right to exploit the work through its 
reproduction, distribute copies of the work, publicly perform the work and 
create  derivative works. In addition to the above rights, which are of an 
economic nature, a copyright also confers moral rights, which are not of 
 
 20.  Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
general rule of law is that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions 
and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 1476, at 56, (Sept. 3, 1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (“Copyright does not 
preclude others from using ideas or information revealed by the author’s work.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
 21.  Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that the “ultimate 
aim” of copyright law is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”); Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright Act was intended to promote creativity, 
thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 
240 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity.”); Julie E. 
Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007) (“Creativity is 
universally agreed to be a good that copyright law should seek to promote . . . .”); Ned Snow, The 
Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 (2013) (“[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright 
that defines the primary objective of copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on creativity).”). 
 22.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors 
and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 
1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he incentive to profit from the exploitation 
of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The 
profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”). 
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practical relevance for the purposes of economic analysis in the United 
States. Although the mere existence of copyright does not necessarily per se 
confer significant market power to owners or their licensees, the success of 
a given item on the market and the exclusive exploitation of the right imply 
market power. 
The idea of creative freedom is apparent itself in intellectual property 
laws. Copyright, despite extension after extension, has a termination date 
codified within the Constitution of the United States in order to secure 
exclusive rights to authors for a limited time.23 Thus, copyright is not 
unlimited. Over the years, it has been extended to cover the length of the 
creator’s life and an additional fifty or seventy years, depending on the date 
of the author’s death, for signatories of the WIPO treaties relating to 
copyrights. 
Copyright protection for original and derivative works encourages 
creativity by increasing the odds of appropriating the benefits of the 
creations. The rationale underlying copyright is that without exclusive rights, 
copyrighted goods would not be produced in adequate quantity and quality, 
therefore leaving society in worse condition. To be eligible for copyright 
protection, a work must be original. However, comparatively simple works 
are entitled to copyright protection so long as the required quantum of 
originality is present.24 In order for a work to be copyrighted, a work only 
has to have a minimal level of originality. 
Occasionally, an idea can become so entangled with its expression that 
the two become inseparable. As a result, that specific work should not be 
protectable, because the work falls within the merger doctrine.25 If there is 
only one or a very limited number of ways to express an idea, the expression 
of that idea is not copyrightable, because granting copyright to the expression 
would grant an impermissible right over the idea itself.26As a result, the work 
 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2015). 
 24.  Katherine L. McDaniel & James Juo, A Quantum of Originality in Copyright, 8 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP.169 (2009); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
parts numbers were not copyrightable, because they are both not original and analogous to short phrases 
or titles); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
publisher’s factual enhancements to judicial opinions were not sufficiently creative and original to 
warrant copyright). 
 25.  Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 463, 481 (Mar. 2010). 
 26.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 
(9th Cir. 1971) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will 
not be barred, since protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 
‘idea’ upon the copyright owner.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 
1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (an expression will be found to be merged into the idea when “there are no or few 
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is not capable of attaining copyright protection. The merger doctrine echoes 
the rule that where the expression is vital to the statement of the idea, or 
where there is only one mode or very few means of expressing the idea, the 
idea and the expression “merge” into an un-protectable totality.27 
Consequently, when an idea and its expression are inseparable, copyright 
law finds the two have “merged” into a single expression, which is not 
copyrightable. The distinction between idea and expression is more difficult 
to make in case where an image expresses an idea in ways that words 
cannot.28 Whether a specific visual image is protectable under the merger 
doctrine is not easily decided.29 For example, a jewelry company could not 
enjoin the manufacture of all jewel-encrusted pins shaped like bees.30 When 
these lines are blurred, as they often are in copyright litigation, courts will 
often favor economic considerations over concerns of freedom of 
expression.31 The merger doctrine mostly applies to architectural works and 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, such as building codes and 
accountancy forms.32 
Copyright protection can supplant other rights, such as patent rights, 
where the ideas are not protectable but the expression is pure computer and 
mathematical algorithms. However, business-method software is one of the 
fastest-growing categories of new patents, and software patents represent 
fifteen percent of all patents.33 The First Circuit held in Lotus v. Borland 
Lotus that the menu command structure for a spreadsheet was an 
 
other ways of expressing a particular idea.”); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he test is whether the accused work is so similar to the 
plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully 
appropriated the plaintiff’s protectable expression by taking material of substance and value.”). 
 27.  Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967); Woods v. Resnick, 
725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 821 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
 28.  Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth 
a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (Jan. 2012). 
 29.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 30.  Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (“When the idea and its 
expression are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression 
in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the 
conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.”). 
 31.  Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright’s Merger and Scenes a 
Faire Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128 (Winter 2007). 
 32.  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 33.  J. Bessen & R.M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 
16, 157–89 (2007). 
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uncopyrightable “method of operation” but this holding was rejected by 
Oracle.34 
The lack of inventiveness in newly granted business method patents 
begs the question as to the degree of inventiveness in other fields of 
technology. It is worth mentioning here that Bilski v. Kappos shows judicial 
disagreement over whether business methods are patent-eligible subject 
matter, evidencing patent law’s struggle to address some technological 
advances.35 Relatedly, copyright law is expected to remain unsettled as new 
issues arise and technology continues to progress. 
B.  Copyright and Freedom of Expression 
Is free speech being depleted by intellectual property, putting both 
individual liberty and the public good at risk? The Constitution clearly 
confers Congress the right to limit speech by forbidding others to make use 
of copyrighted material.36 To that extent, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged the likelihood of a First Amendment defense to copyright 
infringement claims.37  These traditional contours comprising the First 
Amendment are the two key exceptions to copyright infringement: fair use 
and the definitional balance.38 Fair use defenses to copyright infringement 
 
 34.  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by equally divided 
court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 1610, ENCYCLOPEDIA L. 
& ECON. 197 (2000) (noting that, “if switching costs are high enough, giving copyright protection to a 
popular user interface that has become an industry standard can extend the copyright owner’s monopoly 
into the computer, not just the interface market”); see William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Network 
Externalities in 760, ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 970 (2000) (arguing that limiting copyright protection 
for network externalities in the case of computer software could bleed over into other areas of copyright, 
such as fan fiction, and that weakening copyright protection allows greater competition by clones but 
reduces the payoff for innovators); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 35.  561 U.S. 593 (2010); Laura N. Gasaway. Copyright Basics: From Earliest Times to the Digital 
Age, WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 241 (2009–10). 
 36.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Ben Depoorter, Essay, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
817, 837–38 (2013) (describing how a failed constitutional challenge to Congress’s extension of the 
copyright term “became a symbol representing the darker side of the expansion of intellectual property 
laws”). 
 37.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright law 
have not been disturbed, and therefore the built-in free speech protections available in the Copyright Act 
are enough to accommodate the First Amendment); Harper & Row Publishers v. The Nation Enterprises, 
Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 
U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (2015); accord Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); 
Janice E. Oaks, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 
135, 137 (1984). 
 38.  See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding fair 
use for consumers to use video cassette recorders to time-shift television programs); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 539 (1985) (holding that it was not fair use for a magazine, The Nation, to 
quote several hundred key words from the unpublished autobiography of former President Gerald Ford); 
10 ZEKOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/16  1:28 PM 
2016] COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE 321 
claims permit defendants to argue that their infringing use of another’s 
copyrighted work was done for a non-commercial or educational purpose. In 
addition, courts use the fair use doctrine to ascertain, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether an accused infringer should be liable for damages. The definitional 
balance exception precludes copyrighting ideas and facts.39 Like the 
definitional balance between an idea and its expression, fair use plays a large 
role in protecting First Amendment interests against private copyright 
monopolies, if somewhat unsuccessfully.40 The definitional balance and fair 
use analyses are adequate protection for any work that had gained or re-
gained copyright protection from the new legislation.41 
The First Amendment protects non-verbal expression, as well as ideas. 
The Supreme Court has upheld ideas and non-verbal expression as 
constitutionally protected free speech. Examples of these forms of protected 
speech include certain musical lyrics, flag burning, or non-obscene 
pornography.42 When the line between idea and expression is unclear, the 
copyright infringement becomes more difficult.43 
There is no per se ban on First Amendment challenges to copyright 
infringement claims, but there has yet to be a case in which First Amendment 
arguments prevailed. Additionally, no act of Congress has, to date, been held 
to unconstitutionally alter the traditional contours of copyright.44 ACTA 
requires member states to impose both fines and imprisonment for not only 
copying a work, but also “aiding and abetting” a “criminal” infringer.45 
 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that it could be fair use for the music 
group 2 Live Crew to make a rap parody version of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman, and that “[f]air 
use remained exclusively [a] judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.”); Stewart 
v. Abend 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (finding no fair use for the producers of Alfred Hitchcock’s film Rear 
Window to carry on showing the film after their rights were terminated in the underlying story. 
 39.  17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107–15 (2010). 
 40.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that parody is a fair use defense but 
satire is not); Visual Resources Association, STATEMENT ON THE FAIR USE OF IMAGES FOR TEACHING, 
RESEARCH, AND STUDY (2011), 
http://www.vraweb.org/organization/pdf/VRAFairUseGuidelinesFinal.pdf. 
 41.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874(restoring copyright status to foreign works formerly in the public 
domain in the United States, upholding the international copyright treaty and moving public domain 
works back into protected status, thus leading to more restrictive IP provisions). 
 42.  Amanda Beshears Cook, Copyright and Freedom of Expression: Saving Free Speech from 
Advancing Legislation, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 790 (1989); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 43.  Johnson, 491 U.S.  418; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1990). 
 44.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). 
 45.  ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT arts. 23–24, 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/acta1105_en.pdf; Kenneth L. Port, A Case Against the ACTA, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1131, 1165 (Feb. 2012) (arguing that ACTA provisions “are both vague and 
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Criminalizing acts that were historically civil infringement concerns free 
speech proponents.46 The DMCA did not violate the First Amendment rights 
of those who posted decoding programs that would permit other cyberspace 
users to decrypt and manipulate encrypted content.47 It is questionable that 
the DMCA even serves the goal of protecting intellectual property revenue.48 
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), an international treaty that 
sought to harmonize international copyright laws, restored the copyright 
protection of many foreign works that had already entered the public 
domain.49 
Is there a difference between intellectual property laws in common law 
and civil law countries? Gradually, the outgoing protection of private 
property rights has come at the expense of free expression, through modern 
interpretation of copyright doctrine and recent legislative implementation of 
particular international agreements. Civil law countries view intellectual 
property rights as natural rights, and even grant moral rights to copyright 
holders. By contrast, common law countries, such as the United States, view 
intellectual property rights as the only channel to carry out the natural right 
of free expression, and sequentially, the public good. The disregard of 
inherent conflict erodes the right of public dissemination of information in 
favor of private property rights creating private monopolies over information 
and unconstitutionally “chills” expression aggravating the democratic, 
public benefit rationale of the original constitutional clauses.50 
Is there a shared purpose of copyright and the First Amendment?51 Civil 
law countries view copyright as a “natural” right of authorship, while 
common law countries view copyright as a way to incentivize works of 
authorship, and advance the dissemination of information. In common law 
 
frightening to a free society”); Khaliunaa Garamgaibaatar, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: 
Copyrights, Intermediaries, and Digital Pirates, 20 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 199, 201 (2011). 
 46.  Jennifer L. Hanley, ISP Liability and Safe Harbor Provisions: Implications of Evolving 
International Law for the Approach Set Out in Viacom v. YouTube, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 183, 199 (2012). 
 47.  Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 48.  Daniel J. Gervais, Cloud Control: Copyright, Global Memes, and Privacy, 10 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 53 (Winter 2012) 
 49.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); Golan v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 755 (2013) 
(noting that the free software movement is based on the theory that “freedom of use fosters increased 
collaboration, which in turn spurs inventive and creative activity”). 
 50.  Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright law: Forgetting the Past and 
Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 425 (2004). 
 51.  Joshua N. Mitchell, Promoting Progress with Fair Use, 60 DUKE L.J. 1639, 1642–56 (Apr. 
2011). 
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counties, free speech and public dissemination of ideas are “natural rights” 
that are more vital than the legislatively granted intellectual property rights.52 
Permitting authors to benefit from their works for a limited period of 
time persuades authors to disseminate their ideas. In this way, the United 
States Constitution grants Congress the power to ascertain intellectual 
property rights that do not already exist in a natural state and serve the public 
good, which is one of the shared goals of the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment.53 The dissemination of information eventually serves the 
public, as opposed to individual information and the ideas’ own economic 
gain.54 Thus, overprotecting First Amendment rights against copyright law 
leads to the production of less speech of “public interest.”55 
C.  Restrictions to the Rights of Copyright Owners 
Should the unauthorized use of a work be protected by the First 
Amendment?56  Fair dealing and fair use provisions shield personal use 
copying for purposes of research, study, criticism, and review.57 There are 
very few private or personal fair use decisions in the U.S., due to high 
difficulties in revealing such uses and the expense of litigation relative to the 
expected recovery. 58 
The U.S. Code codifies four different fair use factors to use when 
determining whether an author has infringed upon another’s copyright, or 
whether the use is allowable, and accommodates the First Amendment by 
permitting use of another creator’s work through quotations, educational 
purposes, parody, and non-commercial use.59 The “public good” or “public 
 
 52.  David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the 
Image of the First Amendment, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 86–87 (2011). 
 53.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
 54.  5-19E MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.03 (2011). 
 55.  Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact 
on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 18 (1998); United Video v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173, 
1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 56.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 57.  Copyright Law of Japan, Law No. 43, art. 30–31 (June 27, 2012) (Japan) (discussing personal 
use and private study); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 §§ 29–30, c. 48 (Eng.); Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) 40–41 (Austl.). 
 58.  Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012); Recording Indus. Ass’n of 
Am. v. Diamond Multimedia, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding consumer space-shifting 
of music to constitute fair use). 
 59.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) The four fair use factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
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benefit” plays a role in determining the rationale and nature of use under the 
first § 107 factor.60 Fair use plays a substantial part in balancing the interests 
of rights holders, users, and the public concerning many activities that the 
U.S. Congress has not produced explicit R&Is to address.61 Moreover, fair 
use initially evolved as a constraint on the scope of U.S. copyright law to 
balance competing interests in cases in which second comers made 
productive uses of a first author’s work in producing a new one, not to 
balance interests in new technology cases.62 It is worth mentioning that ad 
hoc decisions are made for each case on what is or is not exactly fair use.63 
Fair use causes respect for copyright law. Codes of fair use best 
practices permit user communities to come to a consensus about practices 
that make possible reasonable uses that do not cause appreciable harm to 
authorial markets.64 It is argued that the fair use doctrine inadequately 
protects huge numbers of creators because permitting even a near-exact copy 
inhibits artists from creating new works and publishing those works for 
public view.65 
The idea/expression (or fact/expression) dichotomy is codified in § 
102(b), advancing the dissemination of ideas and permitting an idea or 
factual information to flow freely from one author to another, and from 
 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. Id. 
 60.  Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Random House, Inc., 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 
 61.  Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 
(1990). 
 62.  Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); see Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 
(1968); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the practice 
unfair partly because Texaco was a commercial entity and the copies furthered its commercial interests); 
Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1362–63 (finding photocopying within the Classroom Guidelines to be 
unquestionably fair); 17 U.S.C. § 108(d) (permitting photocopying of single article for library patrons); 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (photocopying 
of copyrighted materials for educational course packs held unfair because licenses opportunities were 
available); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (reaffirming the 
fair use safe harbor but holding that it does not shield those who induce infringement). 
 63.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2014); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994) (finding 
that not all commercial appropriation could be considered infringement, and that the test is how 
“transformative” the parody is of the original work, as well as how much market value the parody directly 
takes from the original). 
 64.  PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK 
IN COPYRIGHT (2011) (discussing the value of best practices). 
 65.   Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the Context 
of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 371, 376 (2010) (arguing that codes of 
best practices often contain “more wishful thinking than reality” and promise more certainty than existing 
case law warrants). 
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authors to consumers of works.66 By preserving ideas and facts for the public 
domain, copyright law evades conflict with the First Amendment serving the 
public good. Copyright law serves public ends by supplying individuals with 
an enticement to engage in private ones.67 
Modern copyright laws grant authors rights to control exploitations of 
their works.68 There is a set of restrictions and impediments (“R&Is”) 
embraced by legislatures or developed through common law adjudication. 
R&Is make possible free uses of protected works under national copyright 
laws, although some R&Is are subject to equitable remuneration 
obligations.69 The following are the various rationales of R&Is: 
The rationales of R&Is are grounded in normative values and views on 
copyright, while others are more pragmatic reactions to the complex 
difficulties intrinsic in the lawmaking process and the prerequisite to balance 
competing interests. 
R&Is promote ongoing authorship such as the fair use doctrine.70 
Indeed, one of the most significant functions of fair use in U.S. law is to 
sponsor ongoing authorship. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court, speaking on fair use, stated that “permit[ting] . . . courts to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute . . . would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”71  Productive uses are fair 
when they are neutral or positive about the works on which they draw.72 
R&Is create a buffer for user autonomy and personal property. 
Balancing the interests of the public with those of authors is a purpose of the 
 
 66.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”). 
 67.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) 
 68.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 69.  17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (2014); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-But-Paid, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1383 (recommending permitted-but-paid L&Es for many “redistributive” uses that 
American courts have ruled are fair, and pointing to foreign L&Es that permit uses subject to 
remuneration). Some European scholars have proposed a model copyright law for the EU under which 
some L&Es would be subject to remuneration. See The Wittem Project: European Copyright Code, art. 5 
(April 2010), www.copyrightcode.eu. 
 70.  Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); New Era Publ’ns Int’l 
v. Carol Publ’g Grp.,904 F.2d 152 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
 71.  510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)); Pierre L. 
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 72.  Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Hofheinz v. A 
& E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that the 
distribution of a recording of a company’s conference call with analysts that disclosed the company’s 
earning was fair use). 
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international copyright system.73 Some R&Is intend to provide public 
benefits fostering the Public Interest in Access to Information. Both authorial 
and broader public interests rationalize R&Is that advance access to works 
and information. The fair use doctrine is the principal way U.S. law fulfills 
this function.74 The exclusion of U.S. government works from copyright 
protections elevates public access to information.75 Data-mining which 
entails digitizing works and indexing their contents so that the texts can be 
analyzed by specialized software programs is considered to be fair use 
defenses.76 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust held that fair use protected 
unauthorized scanning and compiling of books into a searchable database 
involving only a limited set of rationale, so is only preliminary to applying 
fair use to Google Books as a whole. 77 In Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton 
the court also placed more weight on the market influence of the potential 
loss of licensing revenue reversing a safe harbor approach to the application 
of fair use to university course books.78 
R&Is carry out social and cultural policy goals making possible the use 
of in-copyright materials in the course of face-to-face teaching in nonprofit 
educational institutions, facilitating libraries and archives to reproduce 
works to preserve them, and allowing the formation of special format works 
so print-disabled persons have greater access to literary works.79 For 
instance, in the HathiTrust case, the court upheld creation of a full-text 
 
 73.  Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932), cited approvingly in Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005); 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3)–106(5) (2002); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal 
Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
 74.  17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2005) (exempting photographs or pictures of protected works for purposes 
of comment or news reporting); 17 U.S.C. § 108(f) (2005) (allowing libraries and archives to make and 
lend copies of broadcast news programs). 
 75.  17 U.S.C. § 105 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 
2951281 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008). 
 76.  Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding a nonprofit digital library 
made fair use of books from research library collections in developing a full-text searchable database that 
made it possible for researchers to run search queries for books on certain topics of interest); A.V. v. 
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding it fair use to make copies of student papers so 
that a computer program could detect plagiarism); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2003); White v. West Pub. Corp., No. 12 Civ. 1340(JSR), 2013 WL 544057 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Matthew 
Sag, Copyright and Copy Reliant Technology, 103 N.W. L. REV. 1607 (2009). 
 77.  Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 87. 
 78.  769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Dan Nabel, Top 10 Fair Use Cases of 2014 (Guest Blog Post), 
TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/top-10-fair-use-cases-of-2014-guest-blog-post.htm. 
 79.  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, arts. 5(2)(c), 5(3)(b), [2001] 
O.J. (L 167/16–17) [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. 
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searchable database containing copyrighted books for reason of preserving 
the books and of making them more available to print-disabled persons, both 
of which went beyond the contours of the statutory exceptions.80 
R&Is permit public institutions to operate by making and distributing 
copies, and perhaps even to perform, copyrighted works for non-
consumptive governmental purposes.81 Many countries have special 
exemptions from liability for utilization of in-copyright materials in 
investigations, adjudications, administrative proceedings and the like.82 
R&Is carry out economic purposes promoting commerce, competition, 
and continuing innovation which means curing or alleviating market failure 
problems, sometimes through compulsory or statutory licenses and 
sometimes through obvious discharge. Fair use has permitted the reverse 
engineering of software in the U.S.83 For instance, Nintendo, which sold a 
video game system and video games, sued Galoob, a company that sold a 
product called Game Genie that modified Nintendo’s games, for copyright 
infringement; Nintendo alleged that modifying a game with the Game Genie 
created a derivative work, violating Nintendo's copyright in their video 
games.84 Another competition-fostering fair use involved the use of 
copyrighted images in advertising.85 
R&Is exempt economically unimportant supplementary uses. The 
European InfoSoc Directive identifies that incidental copies made of digital 
works not have independent economic significance consenting that these 
incidental copies be exempted from copyright liability. It is worth 
mentioning that there is no equivalent provision in U.S. law.86 
R&Is are embraced for politically useful reasons such as interpreting 
legal protections as extending to public performance rights.87 Some R&Is 
 
 80.  Authors Guild, Inc., 755 F.3d at 87. 
 81.  Shell v. City of Radford, 351 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Va. 2005); Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 
403 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 82.  Copyright Act, Law No. 43 of June 27, 2012, art. 42 (Japan). 
 83.  Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Directive 2009/24/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 6, 
[2009] O.J. (L 111/19). 
 84. Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 85.  Sony Entm’t Am. Inc. v. Bleem LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2002); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair 
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
 86.  Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding incidental 
capture of music in news coverage of parade was fair use); 117 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1998) (permitting owners 
of copies of computer programs to make backup copies); InfoSoc Directive, art. 5(1), [2001] O.J. (L 
167/16). 
 87.  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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present flexibility in copyright laws such as in the occasion copyright owners 
would voluntarily license parodies of their works for the reason that they 
may be indisposed to subject their works to the kind of critical commentary 
that parodies are expected to bring about.88 
D.  Copyright in the Digital Era 
Advances in digital technology, the commercialization of the Internet, 
and the invention of entire new fields of human activity, such as e-commerce, 
nanotechnology, biotechnology and nanobiotechnology, have driven 
alterations in the core of copyright.89 Copyright vests in an inventor, the 
moment he “fixes” the work to a tangible medium of expression.90 
Cyberspace reduces creators’ opportunity for profit as illegal activities and 
free content undercut the legitimate market.91 
Copyright, by contrast to patent law, has for the most part ignored 
technology and in doing so it has purchased some useful adaptability to 
technological change. New technologies regularly disrupt international 
copyright law, requiring that legislatures adjust laws to align with the market. 
International norms shift and develop over time. The internet has tested 
copyright markets and copyright law because the internet has a dark side 
embodied in its broadly realized capability for unlicensed, but always 
 
 88.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
 89.  Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: How User-Generated Content 
Affects Copyright Policy, 10 VAND. J. ENT & TECH. L. 841, 852–54 (2008) (explaining that technology 
advances have decreased cost of producing and distributing expressive works, resulting in more 
blockhead authors); JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU, 14 (2011) 
(describing today’s copyright laws as “a legal regime that threatens to make criminal infringers of us 
all”); id. at 129 (“[T]he widening ambit of copyright protection has increasingly encroached upon critical 
First Amendment values, suppressing transformative uses of copyrighted works that advance creativity 
and free speech rights.”); PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-
ATLANTIC BATTLE (2014) (opposing the author-oriented Continental copyright tradition against the 
public minded Anglo-American copyright tradition and contending that undue attention to authors 
restricts access to culture and suppresses expression). 
 90.  Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that Kirby’s 
comic book characters were works made for hire, and therefore Kirby had no right to terminate transfer 
of copyright to Marvel); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1064–79 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(finding that certain “Superman” works were works made for hire, and therefore not within scope of 
termination right); Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 
613 (2014) (stating that Congress does not have power to enact copyright laws for the benefit of 
disseminators if they do not also benefit authors). 
 91.  ROB LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS, 
AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 252–53 (2011); Robert McCrum, From Bestseller 
to Bust: Is This the End of an Author’s Life?, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 2, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/02/bestseller-novel-to-bust-author-life (citing the rise of 
free content on the internet as a challenge for authors today and finding that writing is increasingly 
unprofitable for unknown authors). 
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perfect, copies and streams of copyrighted works. Moreover, the internet 
makes prospective copyright infringers of us all. Copyright law should 
promote copyright commerce requiring not just readily divisible and 
transferable rights, but also information about those rights. The abundance 
and ready substitutability of copyright goods systematically press toward 
competitive prices. 
The copyright law has every time failed to safeguard the rights of artists 
and authors on cyberspace. In addition, public opinion is hostile toward 
improved copyright protections. Copyright law will remain unsettled as new 
issues arise and technology continues to develop.92 Digitization and the 
internet permitted immediate perfect replication and so IPRs had to grow. In 
2005, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the Copyright Act to embrace a 
form of liability it had never before acknowledged in the context of 
copyright, providing technology that stimulates copyright infringement.93 
Moreover, copyright law present, under the judicially-developed merger 
doctrine, that property rights under copyright law are denied when an un-
protectable idea cannot be separated from protectable illustration of the 
idea.94 
The technology that brings works directly to users’ computers and 
personal portable devices no longer necessitates conventional publishing’s 
infrastructure of intermediaries. In any case, every computer-equipped 
author makes his work directly available to his audience via cyberspace.  
Although availing the resources of distribution is one thing, making a living 
from the works one distributes is another.95 
Copyright is about maintaining control—both economic and artistic—
over the fate of the work.96 Attribution and integrity clauses have 
 
 92.  Laura N. Gasaway, Copyright Basics: From Earliest Times to the Digital Age, WAKE FOREST 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 241 (2009–10). 
 93.  MGM Studios v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 94.  Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2007). 
 95.  Trent Hamm, The Truth About Making Money Online, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 29, 
2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Simple-Dollar/2013/1029/The-truth-about-making-
money-online (describing how “the only way to make money consistently online is to produce a lot of 
content on a very consistent basis,” and that proceeds are often realized in the long-term, not immediately 
after publication); Jim Edwards, Yes, You Can Make Six Figures as a YouTube Star . . . And Still End Up 
Poor, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 10, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-money-youtube-
starsactually-make-2014-2 (finding that even YouTube content providers that generate high gross 
revenue see less than 50% of that revenue, resulting in unsustainable costs for building a business). 
 96.  Vineet Kumar, Making “Freemium” Work, HARVARD BUS. REV. 27 (May 2014) (“Over the 
past decade ‘freemium’—a combination of ‘free’ and ‘premium’—has become the dominant business 
model among internet start-ups and smartphone app developers”). 
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distinguished licenses in the open source software community.97 Authors 
who self-distribute on the internet face the possibility of respect for their 
names and their works, but without remuneration.98 Cyberspace and social 
media have stimulated revolutions both in the music industry.99 
Technological advances have made it significantly easier for musicians not 
only to create/ produce music, but also to distribute it. The Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA), the trade association representing 
the labels, has claimed that “illegal downloading” has resulted in “fewer 
musicians.”100 
Modern media technologies from the VCR onwards have made reader 
copying much easier, and digital media technologies often make copies as 
part of the ordinary reading or playback process. Fair use has stepped in to 
make certain that ordinary acts of reading remain non-infringing.101 
Copyright ignores robots.102 Robotic reading is a form of automation, and as 
such it has to confront familiar critiques of automation’s effects on 
humans.103 It is argued that works authored through artificial intelligence 
should be copyrightable.104 
Copyright laws do not protect the users’ data, as the users energetically 
surrender the protection when clicking to agree to terms of service.105 The 
 
 97.  Rebecca Schoff Curtin, Hackers and Humanists: Transactions and the Evolution of Copyright, 
54 IDEA 103, 115–16 (2014) (noting that free software “values a software author’s moral rights over the 
kinds of exclusive rights conveyed by U.S. copyright law” and describing incorporation of rights of 
integrity and attribution into free software licenses). 
 98.  Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, UTAH L. REV. 563, 672, 
tbl.2 (2004) (comparing the inclusion of rights of integrity and attribution in a few open source licenses 
and discussing the enforcement of the right of integrity under an open source license). 
 99.  Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012). 
 100.  Who Music Theft Hurts, RIAA (2015), 
https://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_details_online. 
 101.  Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. DISH Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 102.  James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657 (2016). 
 103.  Denison v. Larkin, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (N.D Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding fair use to copy blog 
post for use in an attorney discipline proceeding); White v. West Pub’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding transformative fair use for West and Lexis to make comprehensive databases 
of filed legal briefs); Stern v. Does, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding transformative 
fair use to forward email, because “[b]y forwarding the post in e-mails, they conveyed the fact of the post 
rather than its underlying message”). 
 104.  Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 5 (2012); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 537 (2009) (“[C]reativity is a positive virtue, not just because of its results 
but because of how the process of making meaning contributes to human flourishing.”). 
 105.  17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Ed Bayley, The Clicks that Bind: Ways Users “Agree” to Online 
Terms of Service, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Nov. 16, 2009, https://www.eff.org/wp/clicks-
bind-ways-usersagree-online-terms-service. 
10 ZEKOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/16  1:28 PM 
2016] COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS IN CYBERSPACE 331 
doctrine of unconscionability does not protect users from application owners 
wielding their superior power to take away individuals’ rights.106 The 
convergence of technology and new art methods in the form of applications 
has shown that current copyright law is not equipped to provide adequate 
protection.107 
Creators of sound recordings are granted separate exclusive rights that 
can similarly be transferred or licensed to record labels to administer, in 
exchange for capital investment, marketing, promotion and distribution.108 In 
the United States, two types of objects attract copyright in a piece of recorded 
music: musical works and sound recordings. The musical work copyright is 
granted to the composers of the music and lyrics, and the sound recording 
copyright is granted to the creators of the sound recording.109 Since streaming 
comprises a public performance right, a performance license needs to be 
obtained from property rights offices.110 Copyright arguably has become the 
law of missed opportunities.111 
E.  The Online Piracy Problem 
The level of online piracy of copyrighted works today is unanticipated. 
With the growth of streaming services, direct download sites, and peer-to-
peer services such as BitTorrent, the old problem of online piracy has 
 
 106.  Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for 
a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 795 (2004); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a user accepted the terms by using the 
product after clicking through the license agreement on the screen and is, therefore, bound by them). 
 107.  17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Lauren Russell, Mobile Phones Give Artists New Tools to Create, 
CNN, Sept. 19, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/19/living/iphone-art/index.html?iid=article_sidebar; 
MONICA HORTEN, THE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENIGMA: INTERNET POLITICS AND THE ‘TELECOMS 
PACKAGE’, 16–19 (2012). 
 108.  Alex Solo, The Role of Copyright in an Age of Online Music Distribution, 19 MEDIA AND ARTS 
L. REV. 169, 179 (2014); Peter DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and 
Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (2013); Peter Jenner, Copyright in the Digital 
Age; Benefiting Users and Creators?, 8 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 55, 60 (2011); Seth 
Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of Online Music Distribution: Innovation in 
the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1898 (2011). 
 109.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 640–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Brian 
Day, In Defense of Copyright: Creativity, Record Labels, and the Future of Music, 21 SEATON HALL J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 71 (2010). 
 110.  Richard Hooper & Ros Lynch, Streamlining Copyright Licensing for the Digital Age, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE 9 (July 2012), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/dce-report-phase2.pdf. 
 111.  Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright and Musical 
Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1840 (2011) (arguing that today’s copyright would have 
“inhibited creativity by composers such as Bach and Mozart,” who “borrowed extensively in their 
works”). 
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extended and spread in new and often arbitrary manners.112 Peer-to-peer 
systems have become bastions of Internet piracy. Nearly 98.8% of files on 
the LimeWire peer-to-peer system were copyrighted and likely distributed 
without authorization.113 Moreover, around 95% of downloads through the 
Torrentbox and Isohunt sites infringed copyrights.114 This piracy problem is 
not attributable to just a few die-hard infringers, however. The International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry found that 28% of Internet users 
access unauthorized content services each month.115 Today’s pirates grew up 
in a globe with limited enforcement of copyright online. The public backlash 
against SOPA and PIPA has made the U.S. Congress to follow any new 
online copyright enforcement legislation.116 Copyright holders are left with 
the existing copyright law, which has proven unproductive and mismatched 
to stopping piracy in the cyberspace age.117 The DMCA, approved by 
Congress in 1998, is the endeavor of the United States Congress to limit 
Internet piracy of intellectual property. The DMCA implemented a new, self-
help procedure for copyright owners to exercise control over their 
intellectual property creating problems when copyright holders who, for 
political rationale or reason of corporate espionage, want to reduce the 
speech of others abuse it.118 Are technological protection measures such as 
DRM (digital rights management) effective? Various methods of DRM have 
been largely ineffectual.119 
 
 112.  Robert Layton & Paul Watters, Investigation into the Extent of Infringing Content on BitTorrent 
Networks, INTERNET COM. SEC. LAB., at *18 (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.afact.org.au/assets/research/bt_report_final.pdf (excluding pornographic works from 
conclusions due to uncertainty over infringing status). 
 113.  Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 114.  Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at *4, 
*17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
 115.  Digital Music Report 2012, INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS. 9, 16 (2012), 
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf. 
 116.  Jack Schecter, Online Piracy Legislation: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 59 APR. FED. 
LAW 20 (April 2012). 
 117.  Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. 
(2011); see generally Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, SOPA Blackout Aims to Block Internet Censorship Bill, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/sopa-blackout-internet-
censorship_n_1211905.html. 
 118.  Thomas A. Mitchell, Copyright, Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2117 (Oct. 2004). 
 119.  Andrew V. Moshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions: Fighting Piracy with Novel Digital Rights 
Management Technology, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 50, 61 (2012) (“A 
technologically-impervious DRM is unlikely to emerge.”); Jie Hua, Toward A More Balanced Model: 
The Revision of Anti-Circumvention Rules, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 327, 328–30 (2013) 
(describing DRM as a preventative measure against piracy and noting criticism of the DMCA’s 
overprotection of DRM technologies). 
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Anti-piracy interventions are not guaranteed to be effective. Seizing the 
dominant unlicensed website may have significant costs on the structure of 
the piracy market, because it could both incentivize entry of new platforms, 
and engender more competition among existing websites to get a piece of the 
un-served market.120 
Taking down infringing websites is a means to diminish consumption 
of pirated media content and boost licensed consumption. The media 
industry has been significantly influenced by digitization, with information 
and communication technologies altering the way music, movies, and books 
are consumed and produced. Luis Aguiar, Jörg Claussen and Christian 
Peukert argue “concentration of demand decreases after the shutdown, with 
users basing their unlicensed movie consumption on a larger set of websites 
rather than on a single platform.”121 
F.  Direct Liability and Secondary Liability 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) offers a broad 
definition of online service providers and covers different categories of 
online intermediaries. These online intermediaries include Internet Service 
Providers (ISP), search engines and hosting facilities.122 The ability to restrict 
the liability of online intermediaries was one of the most vital policy 
decisions that formed the design of the cyberspace and the freedom of 
users.123 
Online intermediaries have now taken various shapes and forms, thus 
confronting some of the assumptions underlying early liability policies. 
Copyright holders aimed to transfer some of the burden and costs of 
monitoring, detecting, and enforcing rights to online intermediaries.124 
The Copyright Act contemplates enforcement through lawsuits against 
individual direct infringers.125 It is nearly impracticable to hold individual 
 
 120.  B. Danaher, M. Smith, & R. Telang, Piracy and Copyright Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Innovation Policy and the Economy, 14 INNOVATION POLICY & ECON. 25 (2014). 
 121.  LUIS AGUIAR, JÖRG CLAUSSEN & CHRISTIAN PEUKERT, ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT, 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, AND MARKET STRUCTURE 23 (European Commission Joint Res. Ctr. Tech. 
Report, 2015). 
 122.  17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (1999). 
 123.  See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 124.  Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”), H.R. 3261, 112 Cong. (2011) (expanding the liability of 
online intermediaries for copyright infringement and moving copyright enforcement to private hands). 
 125.  17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (2006) (defining an infringer as “[a]nyone who violates any of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner” and allows “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right 
under a copyright” to “institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he 
or she is the owner of it”). 
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Internet users liable for copyright violations. The costs of enforcing 
copyrights—by identifying infringers, gathering evidence, suing several 
individual infringers, and collecting damages—are amplified to such an 
extent that it rendered conventional enforcement measures economically 
unproductive. 
It is worth mentioning that in the early 1990s, some ISPs in the United 
States were liable for copyright infringements committed by their 
subscribers under a strict liability standard. The ISPs were found to be 
strictly liable, because the simple hosting and transmission of infringing 
materials amounted to copyright infringement. Strict liability was later 
discarded by courts and replaced with secondary liability.126 
“Vigilantism” is born from a malfunction of the law.127 Vigilantism only 
occurs when the established order breaks down, such that people begin 
seeking extrajudicial solutions. The turn to private enforcement of copyright 
is the result of a long, persistent breakdown of public copyright enforcement. 
The complexity of holding direct infringers accountable led copyright 
holders to look at alternate liability theories. Secondary liability suits against 
ISPs are slowed down by the safe harbors embodied in section 512 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).128 In order to affirm their rights 
against the immeasurable anonymous cyberspace users pirating their works, 
copyright owners have to convince a court of the need of ISP subpoenas and 
contend with the unwillingness of ISPs to identify subscribers.129 ISPs 
providing Internet access cannot be held liable for direct copyright 
infringement, since merely holding a system that others employ to make 
copies lacks an “aspect of volition or causation,” which is an indispensable 
ingredient in establishing liability.130 ISP liability means  adequate 
 
 126.  Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”), H.R. 3261, 112 Cong. (2011). 
 127.  Rachel Storch, Copyright Vigilantism, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 453, 454 (2013). 
 128.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 129.  New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1-306, No. 2:12-cv-1885-GEB-EFB, 2012 WL 5031651, at *2 
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (“Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a ‘good cause’ test in deciding whether to 
permit expedited discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference.”); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279 
F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Courts in this district have applied a ‘flexible standard of 
reasonableness and good cause’ in determining whether to grant a party’s expedited discovery request.”); 
Patrick Collins, Inc. v Does 1-72, No. 11-58 (RMU/JMF), 2012 WL 177864, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2012) 
(“The Court, therefore, will order plaintiff to show cause why it should assert jurisdiction over the person 
of each John Doe defendant unless it has a good faith belief that that person is domiciled in the District 
of Columbia which . . . may be premised on ‘utilizing geolocation services . . . .”). 
 130.  CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2004); Viacom Int’l Inc., v. 
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc, 165 F. Supp. 2d 
1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that eBay is eligible for the DMCA safer harbor); UGM Recording 
v. Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that video hosting facilities such 
as YouTube and Veoh are covered by the DMCA as it “meant to cover more than the mere electronic 
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knowledge concerning the infringing activity was acquired. Intermediaries 
are held indirectly liable for their subscribers infringing behavior under a 
range of legal doctrines of secondary liability. Liability under copyright law 
does not require an intentional conduct, but volitional conduct on the part of 
the defendant is needed to confirm direct liability to copyright 
infringement.131 Many jurisdictions have employed safe harbor regimes for 
online intermediaries, which mean that intermediaries are sheltered from 
liability for users’ actions.132 
New technologies persistently arise to make each hard-fought 
secondary liability battle outdated. Services and Internet users have caught 
copyright owners in a never-ending game of cat-and-mouse in which the law 
is too slow to carry on with technological advances. ISPs intended their 
network to be used for piracy and energetically encouraged their users to 
share infringing files.133 Moreover, ISPs benefit from cooperating with 
content owners to tackle piracy concerns. Although the DMCA provides a 
safe harbor to ISPs that simply serve as passive conduits for infringing 
material distributed by users, more and more face the risk of falling outside 
of the safe harbor as technology becomes more complicated ISPs.134 
ISPs take on and implement policies that assist copyright enforcement 
on its system. The DMCA safe harbor provisions renewed the necessity to 
diminish liability, in particular, circumstances given the diversity of services 
offered by ISPs on top of the numerous types and different size of ISPs.  
Moreover, online intermediaries were cut off from copyright liability, 
 
storage of data, to specifically encompass the access-facilitating processes offered by a video sharing 
platform service”); J. de Beer & C. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A Non-
Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 404–05 (2009) (targeting enforcement 
efforts at individual infringers, such as the global recording industry’s lawsuits against alleged file 
sharers, have proven to be ineffective); Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) 
(holding that a Bulletin Board System operator was strictly liable for distributing infringing materials 
which were uploaded and downloaded by his users). 
 131.  Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932–33 (2005). 
 132.  J. Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 270 (2006) (“OSPs, 
ISPs, and search engines dominated the technological landscape of 1996–97, and the DMCA and CDA 
were designed to encourage these companies to act only in ways that would not drastically alter their 
business models or technological architectures.”). 
 133.  MGM Studios, Inc. 545 U.S. 913, 925–26 (2005); Bryan H. Choi, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 403 (2006). 
 134.  17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2012). 
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providing they remained passive facilitators of content that others originated 
and reacted upon knowledge of infringing content.135 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) determined that 
there was a close relationship between monitoring/filtering duties and civil 
liberties.136 An ISP was under no duty to take affirmative steps against 
infringements, and so a general obligation to monitor compromises 
fundamental rights: the freedom to conduct business, the right to protect of 
personal data, and the freedom to receive or impart information. 
ISPs have been targeted but with limited outcome.137 ISPs sought an 
explicit immunity under the law but clear-cut rules regarding ISPs’ liability 
in managing infringement claims present a higher level of certainty.  To that 
extent, online intermediaries were conceived of as offering a rather open and 
neutral facilitation of access to content. Keeping intermediaries neutral was 
a purpose that several cyberspace policies shared. 
As cyberspace is now the key channel for many forms of human 
interactions, mega platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and hosting facilities 
such as Apple, Amazon, YouTube, shape exchanges and access to 
information with some imperative inference for competition and consumer 
welfare on top of access to knowledge and civil liberties. Currently, online 
intermediaries display a new type of convergence, exercising control over 
content, access, as well as end users. Moreover, as publishers, online 
intermediaries control both what content becomes available by restrictions 
on open source apps in Apple App Store and the format in which content 
becomes available. Intermediaries are more and more able to exercise control 
over the use of content and so the mounting engagement of online 
intermediaries in publishing content position them in conflict with their role 
as neutral facilitators: in quest of maximizing their income from proprietary 
content, on the one hand, while making possible free-access to open content 
and User Generated Content (UGC) on the other hand. 
Free access to online content is considered as a risk to commercial 
interests, as users are unwilling to pay for content that is freely available on 
 
 135.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(iii) (2012); Council Directive 2000/31/EC §14 (2003); M. E. 
Kaminski, Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 203, 208 
(2012). 
 136.  SABAM v. Netlog, C-360/10 (Belg. 2012); SABAM v. Scarlet, C-70/10 (Belg. 2011); Viacom 
Int’l, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 118–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting the link between profits and duties). 
 137.  Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd, 248 CLR 42, 70 (Austl. 2012); see generally Arista 
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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the same platform.138 The convergence of control over access, content, and 
users’ personal data opposes the neutrality of online intermediaries that was 
the center for policies elaborated in the 1990s.139 As a result, access to 
content in the digital ecosystem is conquered by a handful of online 
intermediaries, and so the ascendancy of a small number of online 
intermediaries inflates severe concerns about the competitiveness and 
openness of future information markets influencing the fitting regulation of 
intermediaries. 
Online intermediaries have faced increasing anxiety to take on a more 
positive approach to copyright enforcement. Online intermediaries have 
been forced to embark on affirmative steps (ex ante) to avert or lessen 
copyright infringements. Copyright holders instruct online intermediaries to 
install filters or accept monitoring method to detect infringing behavior 
being contradictory to the absence of a general duty to monitor.140 At the 
same time, online intermediaries take on voluntarily measures such as 
applying filters or implementing enforcement policies.141 In fact, online 
intermediaries have involved directly as content publishers or by 
strengthening their partnerships with copyright right holders. 
Cyberspace service providers, website operators, content providers, and 
cyberspace users cannot abide by copyright law on the global digital network 
as a consequence of the large number of countries’ copyright laws that apply 
to the actors’ cyberspace activities.142 The variety of potentially applicable 
national copyright laws is triggered by the nature of copyright as an 
intangible right produced by national laws and by the rules for choice of law 
applicable to copyright infringement and other copyright-related matters. 
 
 138.  J. E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE EVERYDAY 
PRACTICE (Yale University Press, 2012). 
 139.  Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to Explain Its Inaction on 
Search Bias, HARV. J.L. & TECH., OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, at *4 (2013). 
 140.  MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2005) (holding inducement doctrine 
may consider failure to install preventive measures as a proof of intent, which is necessary for establishing 
liability for inducement); see, e.g., Case C-70/10, Scarlet v. Sabam, 2011 E.C.R.; Case C-360/10, 
SABAM v. Netlog, 2012 E.C.R. (holding that requiring an OSP to install a filtering system screening the 
entire traffic in order to prevent copyright infringements would be at odds with the e-commerce Directive 
prohibiting imposing a general duty to monitor on intermediary service providers). 
 141.  Christina Angelopoulos, Filtering the Internet for Copyrighted Content in Europe, 
AMSTERDAM L. SCH. RES. PAPER NO. 2012-04 10 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1983866; SUSY FRANKEL & DANIEL J. GERVAIS, 
THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 29 (2014) 
 142.  Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws on the Internet, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 339, 348 (2015); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing A Private International 
Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 729–33 (2009) 
(reviewing the scope of application of the lex loci protectionis rule). 
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Copyright enforcement on cyberspace is challenging because copyright 
owners cope with infringers located in various states and with varying laws. 
For instance, the law in the jurisdiction of the service provider’s domicile 
might not view the content as infringing.143 
G.  EU Copyright 
Open-ended R&Is make it possible for the law to adjust to new 
circumstances, which results in the need for flexible R&Is. It could be argued 
that the necessity for more openness in copyright law is clear in the present 
information society of decidedly vibrant and volatile variation.144 Fair use 
has taken on an imperative role in allowing copyright law to adjust to new 
technological challenges not considered by the legislature. 
United States law, by harmonizing individual rights with societal rights, 
allows for fair use of works and fair dealings benefitting the public, without 
sacrificing the creators’ rights. In most of Europe, a broad fair use exception 
does not exist, but a category of uses are permitted.145 Copyright in common 
law countries has utilitarian roots, while copyright in civil law countries has 
natural rights roots.146 
EU legislation has to be interpreted as far as possible in light of 
international obligations.147 EU decision-makers have taken into account “i) 
the collective and individual licensing of national copyright titles, ii) the 
definition and implementation of copyright exceptions in the digital 
 
 143.  SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING 
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND § 20.01 (2d ed. 2005) (“[D]eriving from the Berne text 
supranational choice of law rules is a delicate, if not improbable, operation.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT 
HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010) (arguing that 
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is not a choice of law provision but is “essentially no more than a 
rule barring discrimination against foreign right holders, which requires a country to apply the same law 
to works of foreign origin as it applies to works of its own nationals”). 
 144.  Public Consultation on The Review of The EU Copyright Rules, European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/index_en.htm; Neelie Kroes, 
Reform of EU Copyright Rules: Your Chance to Give Your Views!, European Commission (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-014/kroes/en/content/reform-eu-copyright-rules-your-chance-
give-your-views. 
 145.  Tyler G. Newby, What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use 
Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1648–49 (1999); PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 7 
(2010). 
 146.  BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63 
(1995). 
 147.  Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA, [2008] C-456/06, paras 30-31 (Ger.), ¶¶ 30–31; Titus 
Alexander Jochen Donner, [2012] C-5/11, ¶¶ 22–24 (Ger.). 
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environment and iii) the types of online enforcement measures that member 
states have to make available to rights-holders as a result of the transposition 
of EU copyright directives” so as to enhance the creation and development 
of EU copyright matters.148  There is a need to preserve contractual freedom 
of both content owners and commercial exploiters. EU legislative measures 
cannot divest copyright holders of the prospect to target a particular public 
and to make licensing fees for online exploitation fair to the actual audience 
reached by content transmissions. Giuseppe Mazziotti argues “[a]ll 
copyright holder representatives firmly reject the idea of any kind of 
legislative reform at EU level that could lead to a more open, technologically 
neutral and effectively harmonised legal framework for copyright 
exceptions.”149 
It has to be taken into account that the territorial nature of copyright is 
not the only element that generates a prevalent national dimension of markets 
for digital content in Europe. Individual creators, content licensors and 
commercial exploiters take a ‘country-by-country’ approach in their relevant 
businesses as a consequence of Europe’s cultural diversity, linguistic 
specificities and digital divides varying per capita income from one member 
country to another. 
The making of the EU Digital Single Market is a policy objective rooted 
in the “Digital Agenda for Europe.”150 Markets for digital content are 
disintegrated and highly differentiated for grounds that are not related to the 
territorially limited scope of copyright. In Europe, unauthorized access to 
online content through peer-to-peer networks is broadly prevalent, but in the 
U.S. legitimate services, providing online content like Netflix, engender 
much more traffic than in the EU.151 Unification of EU copyright law would 
have instant EU-wide effect, giving rise to a single market for copyright and 
related rights through eliminating the territoriality of national copyright 
rules, particularly if the system were construed as prevailing over national 
titles entailing a legislative reform of EU law.152 There is a de facto 
harmonization of the originality condition for subject-matter other than 
 
 148.  Giuseppe Mazziotti, Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market Report of the Ceps Digital 
Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies, at *9 (2013). 
 149.  Id. at *11. 
 150.  Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe, 
COM(2010) 245 (May 19, 2010),  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 
52010DC0245R(01)&from=EN. 
 151.  Global Internet Phenomena Report, SANDVINE INTELL. BROADBAND NETWORK, 2H (2012). 
 152.  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 118, 2012/C 326/01 (Dec. 13, 2007). 
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computer programs, photographs and databases, but also paved the way to a 
comprehension of EU copyright architecture as one of open-ended subject-
matter categorization.153 It is worth mentioning that diverging standards of 
originality across the EU ruins the running of the internal market.154 It is 
worth mentioning that that copyright protection is reserved to ‘works’ in the 
Berne sense, i.e. subject-matters that are intellectual creations of their 
authors.155 
In Football Dataco v. Sportradar, the CJEU held that the act of re-use 
is deemed to be located in the territory where user’s computer receives the 
content for purposes of storage and display on screen.156 In UsedSoft, the 
CJEU defined the exclusive right of distribution of the owner of a computer 
program.157 To this end, the provisions of the 2001 Information Society 
Directive define the exclusive rights of distribution and of making content 
available to the public would need to be revised with the intention of making 
the exhaustion principle applicable to permanent sales of intangible copies 
of copyrighted works. It is argued that exhaustion of the right of distribution 
applies to the tangible copy of a work.158 The CJEU concluded that Article 
4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive has to be interpreted as meaning that the rule 
of exhaustion therein does not apply in circumstances in which the 
reproduction of a protected creation has undergone a substitution of its 
medium, and is placed on the market again in its new form. Does the law 
allow digital exhaustion? It is argued that there is no exhaustion for digital 
copies of works and e-books are subject to the principle of exhaustion.159 In 
 
 153.  EUR. PARL. (2009/24/EC) (2009) (addressing the legal protection of computer programs); EUR. 
PARL., O.J. (L 111) (2009); EUR. PARL., O.J. (L 77) (1996) (addressing the legal protection of databases); 
EUR PARL., O.J. (L 372) (2006) (codifying the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights) 
; Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int’l A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] I-06569; Case C-393/09 
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, [2010] I-13971; 
Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
and C-429/08 Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, [2011] I-09083. 
 154.  E. ROSATI, ORIGINALITY IN EU COPYRIGHT: FULL HARMONIZATION THROUGH CASE LAW 
(Edward Elgar, 2013). 
 155.  Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S, cit, [33]–[35]. 
 156.  C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v SportradarGmbH et Sportradar AG, 18 October 
2012, paras. 39–43. 
 157.  C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., 3 July 2012. 
 158.  Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright, C-419/13, EU:C:2015:27(concluding 
that “exhaustion of the distribution right applies to the tangible object into which a protected work or its 
copy is incorporated if it has been placed onto the market with the copyright holder’s consent”); Directive 
2001/29, art. 4(2) (providing that for the InfoSoc Directive, the authorised first sale of a work within the 
territory of the European Union exhausts the right of the copyright owner to control any subsequent 
distribution of the work in question). 
 159.  22 U 60/13 (Ct. of App. of Hamm); see E Rosati, No Exhaustion Beyond Software: Katfriend 
Translates German Decision on Audiobooks, THE IPKAT (July 1, 2014), http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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the US, it is unclear whether the law permits application of the first sale 
doctrine within §109 of the U.S. Copyright Act to digital copies.160 
The sale of intangible copies through cyberspace entails the exercise of 
the sole right of making content available, whereas exhaustion applies only 
to the right of distribution of physical copies.161 Amazon has developed a 
system of ‘data stores’ where the user who no-longer desires to retain the 
right to access the now used digital content is given the likelihood of 
transferring it to another user’s personalized data store, while deleting the 
used content from the originating data store.162 
Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 (the “InfoSoc Directive”) permits 
member states to set up into their own copyright laws an exception or 
limitation to the rights of reproduction, communication and making available 
to the public, and/or distribution, for the purpose of “caricature, parody or 
pastiche” but there is no definition of these concepts.163 The CJEU held that 
the person who owns the copyright to a work has a legitimate interest in 
making certain that this is not related with the message communicated by its 
parody if it is prejudiced. A parody evokes an on hand work while being 
perceptibly different from it, and constitutes an expression of humor. The 
AG then stated that the notion of parody must be considered as an 
autonomous concept of EU law demanding a uniform application of EU 
law.164 Additionally, one of the objectives of the InfoSoc Directive is to 
harmonize specific aspects of copyright and related rights. Besides 
 
2014/07/no-exhaustion-beyond-software-katfriend.html; District Court of KG ZA 2014, C/13/567567 
14-795 SP/SV, Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet (Neth.); see M. Olmedo 
Cuevas, Dutch Copyright Succumbs to Aging as Exhaustion Extends to E-Books.10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
& PRACTICE 8 (2015). 
 160.  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Eleonora Rosati, 
Online Copyright Exhaustion in a Post-Allposters World, J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRACTICE (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613608. 
 161.  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection 
of Computer Programs, art. 6, [2009] O.J. (L 111/19) (codifying the content of Council Directive 91/250 
EEC of 14 May 1991); InfoSoc Directive, art. 4.2 [2001] O.J. (L 167/16). 
 162.  U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 B1(filed May 5, 2009). 
 163.  C-201/13, Judgment in Deckmyn v Vandersteen, EU:C:2014:2132; InfoSoc Directive, art. 4.2 
[2001] O.J. (L 167/16); E. Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright. Full Harmonization through Case Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2013); C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, EU:C:2009:465, 
¶ 27; C-467/08, Padawan SL v Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE), 
EU:C:2010:620, ¶ 32; C-510/10, DR and TV2 Danmark A/S v NCB — Nordisk Copyright Bureau, 
EU:C:2012:244, ¶ 33; R. Jacob, Parody and IP claims: A Defence?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE 
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 427, 431 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, eds., 
2014) (arguing that “when it comes to parody ‘the genre’ has no rules, making legislation immensely 
difficult. Parody ranges from the downright brutally offensive to the respectful hommage”). 
 164.  C- 201/13, Opinion of Advocate Pedro Cruz Villalón in Deckmyn v Vandersteen, 
EU:C:2014:458. 
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harmonization, the other InfoSoc Directive’s objective was to align EU 
copyright law and implement into the EU legal order the 1996 WIPO Internet 
Treaties.  Videogames are not considered merely as computer programs, but 
being complex multimedia works expressing autonomous narrative and 
graphic creations, such games are regarded as intellectual works protected 
by copyright under the InfoSoc Directive.165 Member States have to embrace 
a very similar, if not identical degree of copyright protection not including 
where InfoSoc Directive leaves them some liberty, as is for example the case 
of the optional list of exceptions and limitations in Article 5.166 It is argued 
that the scope of copyright protection should not depend on the probable 
differences in the degree of creative freedom in the production of different 
categories of works, which means that the InfoSoc Directive envisages the 
protection of all intellectual creations by the same reproduction right.167 
Are the copyright exceptions in the EU still suitable? The Information 
Society Directive did not manage to successfully harmonize copyright 
exceptions beyond a specific extent, since there was no agreement between 
EU legislators about the acts and uses that should have been exempted from 
copyright’s scope in digital surroundings. The 2001 Directive did not make 
its exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations mandatory for member states. 
The concept of fair compensation, within the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) of 
the Information Society Directive, is an autonomous concept in EU law. In 
Padawan v. SGAE, the CJEU simply held that fair compensation should be 
designed on the grounds of the criterion of the harm caused to authors of 
protected works by the introduction of the private copying exception.168 
Hardware-based levies are no longer desirable, since new models of 
content distribution are developing rapidly and cloud-computing is 
revolutionizing consumers’ copying habits.169 Hardware and device 
manufacturers promote the accomplishment of alternative forms of fair 
compensation, and assure copyright owners revenues in the long run and a 
well-functioning ecosystem for creativity. 
 
 165.  Case C-355/12, Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl (Jan. 23, 2014); Case C-355/12, Opinion of 
Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston in Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl, (Sept. 19, 2013); InfoSoc 
Directive [2001] O.J. (L 167/16). 
 166.  Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG (Oct. 3, 2013); Case C-387/12 Hi Hotel 
HCF SARL v Uwe Spoering (Apr. 3, 2014). 
 167.  Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, [2009] I-06569; UK 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“CDPA”). 
 168.  C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad General Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) (Oct. 21, 
2010). 
 169.  C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland Gmbh (June 16, 2011). 
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The development and diffusion of broadband cyberspace access 
services and cloud-based platforms have made it easy for both large-scale 
copyright infringers and unauthorized users to retrieve content through cyber 
lockers and other web-based platforms. This new copyright infringement has 
extended its negative cost on the business of creative industries by aiming at 
areas such as the film industry. Piracy had not been a considerable influence 
in copyright law before the advent of broadband cyberspace and cloud-
computing. In L’Oréal v. eBay, the CJEU shed light on the intricate 
interaction of online enforcement measures and of the liability exemption 
that the law grants to hosting service providers.170 The online operator 
benefited from the safe harbor provision insofar as it confined itself to 
providing a neutral service by a simply technical and automatic processing 
of the content provided by its customers. To that extent, the exemption 
should not apply when the online intermediary plays an active role that 
would imply knowledge of (or control over) such content. 
Member states and national courts cannot impose on online 
intermediaries general obligations to monitor the content they store or 
transmit.171 The CJEU has held that, in granting online enforcement 
measures, the protection of intellectual property should be reasonable against 
the protection of fundamental rights of persons and firms that unlimited 
filtering measures would without doubt influence.172 
Injunctions that would compel systematic and enduring filtering 
measures on online intermediaries challenge the principle of freedom of 
expression and communication insofar as filtering tools cannot differentiate 
between transmissions of unlawful and lawful content.173 Copyright 
enforcement on cyberspace leads to restriction of lawful content 
communications, particularly when the target of measures is a website where 
some lawful content might be stored. Global waves of protests against SOPA 
in the U.S. and ACTA in the EU have resulted. Arguments and policy aims 
such as ‘Internet freedom’ and net neutrality have been used very broadly by 
civil liberties organizations to appraise and discard all forms of online 
content blocking for reasons of copyright enforcement. A balancing equation 
 
 170.  C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay International (July 12, 2011). 
 171.  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Legal Aspects 
of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on 
Electronic Commerce) [2000] O.J. (L 178/13). 
 172.  C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefonica (Jan. 29, 2008); C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM 
(Nov. 24, 2011); C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog (Feb. 16, 2012). 
 173.  C-70/10. Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (Nov. 24, 2011); C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog (Feb. 16, 
2012) (addressing, respectively, lawfulness of enforcement measures requiring lasting filtering 
technologies to an ISP and the owner of a social network platform). 
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between copyright enforcement and cyberspace censorship has been 
projected often to portray the chilling consequences stemming from content 
bans or technical restrictions to information made available online. 
Is there a relation between copyright versus freedom to run a business? 
The broad filtering measure requested by the Belgian collecting society 
SABAM would have led to a serious restriction of the freedom of the ISP to 
conduct its business which means that such a measure obligate the ISP to put 
in place an intricate, costly, and permanent filtering technology at its own 
expense. 174 
EU law obliges member states to make personal data available for 
collection for precise, explicit and legitimate reasons, and any processing 
should be pertinent and balanced to the objective pursued. Copyright 
enforcement is a legitimate reason validating the treatment of personal 
data.175 
III.  TRADEMARK LAW 
A.  Trademarks Legal Background 
Trademarks have been used to designate the source or origin of products 
for years. A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” used by a company to identify itself as the source of 
particular goods and distinguish its goods from those manufactured or sold 
by competitors.176 
A trademark can be identified as a nexus between a specific mark and 
a producer. A manufacturer must not defraud or mislead the consumer, who, 
as the end-user of the product in circulation, will eventually be called upon 
to interpret and assess this nexus. No one is entitled to sell or deliver 
commodities under the appearance that the commodities derive from 
someone else.177 It is essential to avoid misleading consumers and facilitates 
 
 174.  C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (Nov. 24, 2011). 
 175.  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 
6 [1995] O.J. (L 281/31); C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de 
España SAU (Jan. 29, 2008). 
 176.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. 514 U.S. 159, 170–71 (1995); 
Dastar Corp. v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (2003); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v 
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
 177.  Millington v Fox (1838), 3 My. & C. 338 (U.K.); Perry v Truefitt (1842), 6 Beav. 66, 49 Eng. 
Rep. 749 (“A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goods of another man; 
he cannot be permitted to practice such a deception, nor to use the means which contribute to that end.”). 
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consumer inclination to sustain additional expenses in exchange for 
assurances that the product being purchased emanates from a particular 
source or producer. The consumer has a right to expect a consistent and 
uniform level of quality when purchasing goods or services associated with 
a specific trademark originating from a single source. When a producer uses 
another’s trademark to deceive the consumer, he or she violates the rights of 
the legitimate trademark holder. Trademark law displaces confusion between 
two trademarks and so a future trademark that engenders a likelihood of 
confusion with a registered trademark may not be registered. 
Cyberspace is used to disseminate information, expand networks and 
generate commercial opportunities.178 Cyberspace engenders trans-boundary 
disputes over trademarks and other aspects of intellectual property. The 
globalization of communications via the Internet has led to a system where 
trademarks and trade names may be used as a method of communication, via 
domain names. Thus, domain names may be both address and trademark. 
B.  Marks as Trademarks 
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof” used in commerce to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.179 Trademarks, when registered at the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO), merit protection against infringements, unfair 
competition, dilution etc. Similarly, trade names are names used to identify 
a person’s business or vocation. They cannot be protected as trademarks, but 
are still entitled to protection against unfair competition. Certification marks 
designate that particular goods have been certified by the owner of the mark 
regarding origin, material, method of infrastructure, quality and accuracy.180 
Certification marks, as protected by national and international IP law, have 
become a de facto obstacle to market access for exporters from developing 
and the least developed states that are not members of TRIPS.181 
A descriptive mark is a word, name, or symbol used to indicate a brand 
of merchandise or service describing the qualities or characteristics of the 
 
 178.  The number of “hits” a domain name receives can be used in determining the value of the 
domain name, because a potential domain name purchaser is more likely to pay more for a domain name 
that receives many “hits” than one that receives very few. 
 179.  Lanham Act 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006). 
 180.  Mariela Maidana-Eletti, Market Access and Trademark Protection in the WTO Regime: The 
Case of Certification Marks, RECHT UND GESUNDHEIT: JUNGE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT LUZERN 69, 82 
(2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602000. 
 181.  NEIL WILKOF & DANIEL BURKITT, TRADE MARK LICENSING, 176–78 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d 
ed. 2005). 
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merchandise or service sold under that mark. The Lanham Act allows 
applicants to register marks that are “distinctive” of the applicant’s goods or 
services in commerce, including descriptive marks that have “become 
distinctive.”182 
Descriptive marks do not distinguish the origin or source of a product 
as well as a mark that is fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive because descriptive 
terms retain their original descriptive meaning.183 Hence, descriptive terms 
used as marks do not automatically or immediately signal a brand (unlike 
inherently distinctive marks), because they also describe the attributes of the 
product. 
Generic marks, such as “Shredded Wheat” breakfast cereal, include the 
common name for a class of products or services and are never considered 
worthy of trademark protection.184 If the key connotation of the term in the 
minds of the consuming public is the product, rather than the producer, the 
mark cannot be protected under trademark law.185  Protecting exclusive rights 
in generic terms would restrain free expression in the marketplace and 
damage competition, and companies cannot have a monopoly on the use of 
common words that consumers use to refer in general to a product. 
Trademark law stifles the free flow of commercial information more 
than necessary when it protects exclusive rights in inherently distinctive 
marks and descriptive marks. Trademark laws harm speech when they grant 
exclusive rights in marks that are not inherently distinctive. Trademark law 
should persuade companies to use inherently distinctive marks as these 
marks instantaneously tell a customer that the term refers to a brand name, 
not a product attribute.186 It is necessary to protect the capability of 
consumers to identify and distinguish among the products of a business and 
its competitors; descriptive trademark laws do not directly advance this 
interest and are more extensive than necessary.187 Distinctiveness is a 
requirement to register a mark on the federal principal register, and for 
protection of exclusive trademark rights. However, the term “distinctive” is 
 
 182.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1052(e)(1), 1052(f), 1053 (2006). 
 183.  Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods Co. 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995), quoted in Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 212–3 (2000) (“Consumers are therefore predisposed to regard those 
symbols as indication of the producer.”). 
 184.  Kellogg Co. v Nat’l Biscuit Co. 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (rejecting the plaintiff’s contention 
that it was entitled to exclusive use of the generic term “shredded wheat”). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park & Fly 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
 187.  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission 447 U.S. 557 (1980); S.F. 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
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not defined anywhere in the Lanham Act.188 The distinctiveness of a mark is 
judged either on the basis of its nature or character, or on the starting point 
of whether it has been used to such an extent that it has come to be 
established as signifying the origin of the applicant’s goods or services.189 To 
this extent, only distinctive marks are eligible for trademark protection, 
generic terms can never become valid marks, and descriptive terms are 
protectable if they acquire distinctiveness.190 
Existing descriptive trademark laws arguably restrict more speech than 
required by protecting rights in marks that are not distinctive and used fairly 
and in good faith by others.  As a result, trademark law is broader than 
necessary by granting and enforcing exclusive rights in descriptive marks, 
along with protecting trademark rights in inherently distinctive marks.191 If 
the mark owner stops using the mark and does not intend to again use the 
mark, trademark rights for the mark will be extinguished and the mark will 
be abandoned.192 If clients think the mark is the name of the product rather 
than a source indicator, the mark has ceased to function as a trademark, 
becoming the generic term for the product itself.193 
Trademark use has been a requirement for the acquisition and 
maintenance of trademark rights, and showing that the defendant used or is 
 
 188.  Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.1051–1127 (2002). 
 189.  Michael Handler, A Critical Assessment of Trade Mark Distinctiveness and Descriptiveness 
under Australian Law, 28th Annual Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New Zealand 
(IPSANZ) Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand, Sept. 19–21, 2014, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509994; Modena Trading Pty Ltd v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 
110; Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd [2014] HCATrans 53 
 190.  Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2010) (use of 
Lexus mark in domain names by independent Lexus brokers to identify the services they offered); Century 
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–22 (3d Cir. 2005) (use of real estate 
company marks by Internet real estate referral service on its website); New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (use by newspaper of pop music group’s 
mark for telephone survey among readers). 
 191.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (noting that the majority correctly determined that “the regulations [at issue] fail 
even the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”); United States v. Edge Broad. Co. 509 U.S. 418, 426 
(1993) (“The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression”); City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 422 
(1993)(“Speech proposing a commercial transaction is entitled to lesser protection than other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression”); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United States Olympic Comm. 483 
U.S. 522, 535 (1987)(“Commercial speech “receives a limited form of First Amendment protection”). 
 192.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 193.  Nautilus Group, Inc., v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. 372 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(stating that “generic terms . . . are not [capable of receiving trademark protection]. Generic terms describe 
a category of products, and therefore cannot signal any particular source: A trademark answers the buyer’s 
questions ‘Who are you? Where do you come from? Who vouches for you?’ But the generic name of a 
product answers the question ‘What are you?’”). 
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using the plaintiff’s mark, or a mark similar to it, is required for bringing a 
claim of trademark infringement. Trademarks are a psychological incident, 
deriving their function and effectiveness from the human inclination to rely 
on a likeable symbol for making purchasing choices.194 
As mentioned earlier, a trademark is any “‘symbol’ or ‘device’ . . . 
capable of carrying meaning” that serves as a commercial signature placed 
upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.195 A right to the 
mark in gross and the legal protection of the “psychological function of 
symbols” are separated196 Trademarks convey property rights in gross.197 
Any conduct  in which trademark law applies has to engross the use of a 
symbol in a way that consumers can perceive the symbol so that it can exert 
its commercial pull on them. 
Proper trademark usage requires use of the mark as directly associated 
with the goods sold under the mark as possible with immediate customer 
perception of the relationship of goods and mark, is indispensable for the 
creation of trademark rights.198 Hence, there is a need for open and noticeable 
use of the mark in close proximity to the goods sold under it, so as to permit 
consumers to perceive the goods and mark together. Physical affixation of 
the mark on the goods if possible is required.199 It is worth mentioning that 
the development of digital goods and services makes the affixation of a mark 
in electronic form important for those goods and services in order for 
customers to perceive the mark and goods together. Trademark law permits 
a high level of protection for arbitrary trademarks, for example, a common 
 
 194.  United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co. 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (viewing trademarks as “a 
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing 
mark or symbol—a commercial signature—upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold”). 
 195.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); United Drug Co. v. 
Theodore Rectanus Co. 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918); 15 U.S.C. 1127 (2001). 
 196.  Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. at 97; Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge 
Co. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
 197.  Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Group, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Promatek Indus., Ltd v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2003); Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum 
Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1990) (defendant used allegedly infringing mark as its corporate name, 
in its advertising and marketing materials, and to identify itself to callers on the telephone); Green Prods 
Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (defendant used 
plaintiff’s trademark as domain name for defendant’s web site); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt (Cal.) 
Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (defendant used allegedly infringing 
mark in a domain name for the defendant’s website). 
 198.  Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002).; 
McDonald’s Corp. v. Burger King Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 199.  Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying 
the likelihood of confusion test to ascertain whether the defendant’s use of its trademark violated 
plaintiff’s trademark right). 
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word or phrase that is used in an uncommon way, and descriptive trademarks 
that have acquired secondary meaning with a relatively lower level of 
protection.200 
Trademarks express source and quality information to consumers 
through the use of brand names, logos or symbols adorning goods and 
services.201 A trademark signifies that goods bearing the mark come from the 
same source and are of consistent level and quality. Companies utilize new 
branding techniques that make use of “non-traditional marks” such as color, 
sound and even scent to distinguish their products from competitors’ 
products and entice consumers. Businesses use these symbols not only as 
source signifiers, but also as promises of reliability and quality. Consumers 
neither know nor care about the true origin of the product, only that it is the 
quality they seek. As mentioned earlier, a mark is a source-identifying 
symbol, and customers depend on these marks to differentiate one brand of 
a product from another.202 
The functionality doctrine bars trademark protection for source 
identifying product features that add to the functional performance of a 
product. In patent and copyright law, functionality clearly assigning 
intellectual property subject matter to the IP law designed to incentivize it. 
In patent law, only functionally useful inventions can obtain utility patents 
and the distinction between functional and ornamental defines the line 
between utility patents and design patents. In copyright, the idea-expression 
and merger doctrines direct functionally useful subject matter to the patent 
system.203  The rationale of trademark law is not to incentivize innovation, 
but rather to guard source-identifying symbols that consumers utilize to 
access information concerning product quality. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) addressed non-traditional 
trademark registration and established procedures tackling many of the 
 
 200.  Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 
the test developed in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976), and 
noting that “Amazon” for an online bookstore is an example of an arbitrary trademark); see also 
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that “[a]n ‘arbitrary’ mark has a significance recognized in everyday life, but the thing it normally 
signifies is unrelated to the product or service to which the mark is attached, such as CAMEL cigarettes 
or APPLE computers”) (internal quotations omitted); Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The law conceptually classifies trademarks along a spectrum of increasing 
distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.”) 
 201.  Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (noting that trademarks are “valuable 
business assets” and it is “the policy of the law to protect them as assets of a business”). 
 202.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995). 
 203.  Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, UNIV. TEX. SCH. L., L. & ECON. 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. E557, at 1, 2 (May 2015). 
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concerns raised by non-traditional trademarks in the United States. The 
European Union’s strict graphic representation requirement for non-
traditional trademark registrations provides legal certainty and 
accessibility.204 Two initiatives combine to create European Union trademark 
law—the First Council Directive and the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation.205 Graphic representation ensures that the scope and nature of 
the mark are plainly defined and comprehensible so that searchers checking 
the registry can readily ascertain what is registered. The ECJ requires graphic 
representation by “means of images, lines or characters, so that [the mark] 
can be precisely identified.”206 European Union trademark law acknowledges 
that while consumers often recognize traditional marks, such as words and 
logos as readily indicating source, this may not be the case with colors, 
sounds and scents. 
Harmonized EU trademark law absorbs the role traditionally vested in 
national unfair competition laws by proposing broader protection of 
goodwill and growing control over “referential” (nominative) use.207 There 
is a need for broad trademark rights to also harmonize trademark law in the 
EU, such as combining a general fair use clause with several more precise 
provisions.208 The Parliament and the Council rejected the initial 
Commission proposal, which sought to reduce trademark protection to the 
traditional understanding of trademarks.209 Trademark protection does not 
unnecessarily limit freedom of expression and competition, and the 
recommendation explains that the interests of trademark proprietors and 
consumers are not only at stake, but also those of competitors. The use of the 
mark should only be held to infringe where it is obviously unfair.210 Because 
 
 204.  Case C-447/02 P, KWS Saat AG v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-10119; Case C-283/01, Shield Mark 
BV v. Joost Kist H.O.D.N., 2003 E.C.R. I-14323; Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent und 
Markenamt, 2001 E.C.R. I-11750. 
 205.  First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate to the Laws of the 
Member States Relating to Trade Marks, recitation 9, 1989 O.J. (L 40/1); Council Regulation (EC) No. 
40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11/1). 
 206.  Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent und Markenamt, 2001 E.C.R. I-11750; Case 
C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist H.O.D.N., 2003 E.C.R. I-14323; Case C-49/02, Heidelberger 
Bauchemie GmbH 2004 E.C.R. I-6134. 
 207.  Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185. 
 208.  Case C-236/08-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-
02417. 
 209.  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark, at 3, COM (2013) 161 final (Mar. 27, 
2013). 
 210.  G.B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark Law School Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing 
Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 152 (2009) (“However, as the scope of 
trademark protection expands and the metes and bounds of protection become more uncertain, we cannot 
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marks indicate their commercial origin, and channel the flow of revenues 
procured on the market back to their proper commercial source, they do not 
interfere with competition on the production level. Therefore, competitors 
are free to offer exactly the same product, but  only if they use a different 
mark indicating a different origin.211 Marks consisting of the shapes of goods 
are not to be treated differently from other marks,212 because shapes are 
subject to an absolute and enduring exclusion from protection in order to 
safeguard competition interests.213 
C.  Trademarks as Domain Names 
Managing domain names remains central for the functioning of 
cyberspace. State-enacted law has been very inadequate in terms of 
regulating domain names, even with intervention. Special private tribunals 
or panels, such as the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(“UDRP”), decide conflicts concerning domain names. Legal certainty and 
predictability are difficult to accomplish with the UDRP, because of the lack 
of precedent, and the multinational composition of the panels. 
ICANN organizes and oversees the Internet’s underlying address book, 
namely the Domain Name System (“DNS”). The DNS administers the DNS 
root zone management, such as generic (“gTLD”) and country code Top-
Level Domains (“ccTLD”). 
The first step in materializing a corporate presence in cyberspace is to 
choose a domain name that is thoroughly conceived in order to sufficiently 
represent the company or organization using it. A domain name is equivalent 
to a telephone directory or directory assistance for the Internet. If the 
organization switches IP addresses, the same memorable or deducible 
domain name can still be used by the organization. Dilution problems arise 
when any non-trademark holders use domain names based on famous marks 
for their own websites.214 
The chosen domain name often conflates the company’s trademark. In 
other words, if a company has a mark or trade name, the company should 
 
rely exclusively on creative interpretation of the prima facie cause of action to establish limits. Trademark 
law must more consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values at stake in trademark 
disputes.”). 
 211.  Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke; Case T450/09, Simba Toys v. OHIM 
(concerning trade mark protection for a three dimensional puzzle in the shape of Rubik’s cube). 
 212.  Cases C-53/01–C-55/01, Linde, Winward and Rado v. DPMA, 2003 E.C.R. I-03161 
(concerning the shapes of a fork-lift truck, a torchlight and a wristwatch). 
 213.  Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee v. Huber and Attenberger, 1999 E.C.R. 
I-2823. 
 214.  Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963). 
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have a domain name that is the same as the mark or trade name enhancing 
communication with the company’s customer base. The chosen name must 
plainly identify the company, enabling the consumer to distinguish the 
requisite nexus between the corporation and the Internet URL. A URL or 
Internet site address will contain a trademark as the second level domain and 
as a distinctive identifier of a company. 
Except for functioning as locators/addresses, domain names function as 
signs to pinpoint goods or services that are being offered on cyberspace. As 
a result, such unauthorized commercial uses normally constitute trademark 
infringement. Therefore, the overlap between trademark law and domain 
names is very high.215 
A domain name facilitates the identification of Internet hosting 
services; entails the devolution of rights to a single, exclusive owner; and 
conveys uninterrupted monopolies in cyberspace.216 Rules pertaining to 
trademark registration do not extend to domain name registration, and due to 
weak registration requirements, registrants have the power to create a 
monopoly in generic terms such as “mail,” “toys” or “book.”217 
Internet domain names increasingly require rigid protection and 
enforcement.218 Courts clearly should continue to apply the likelihood of 
confusion standard, the average consumer test, whenever confronted with 
domain name disputes. If a company uses a domain name with the aim of 
hijacking customers from another competitor, its conduct clearly violates the 
Lanham Act.219 
Domain name registration alone would not amount to using a trademark 
pursuant to the Trademark Act.220 The name must be used as a source 
indicator. Hence, the resemblance between two trademarks remains a 
determining factor in the inquiry, because where two marks are wholly 
dissimilar, there is no likelihood of confusion. Comparable considerations 
also govern scenarios where users of contentious trademarks operate in 
 
 215.  Chih-Hong (Henry) Tsai, The Trademark/Domain Name Protection War: A Comparative Study 
of the U.S., UDRP and Taiwanese Law, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 350 (2013). 
 216.  Thomas v. Network Solutions Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 503–04 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 217.  Shade’s Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 1999) (expounding that for 
“Internet businesses who make the mistake of choosing a domain name deemed descriptive or generic, 
there seems to be little that they can do to gain trademark protection for their domain name”). 
 218.  Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that 
“disputes over domain names have become increasingly common with the expanding commercial use of 
the Internet”). 
 219.  Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997), aff ‘d 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998) (confronting an anti-abortion 
website). 
 220.  Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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geographically different markets. There is a need to examine whether the 
products or services offered are inextricably intertwined, along with the 
“competitive proximity” between the companies and products at hand. 
Moreover, courts examine whether the same customer is targeted and 
whether cyberspace is used as a vehicle for marketing and advertisement. In 
Brookfield, both marks relied on a common channel to disseminate 
information. 
Are domain names more like addresses, and geographic designators, 
rather than trademarks? Because marks that are primarily geographic in 
nature are not entitled to trademark protection, neither would be domain 
names if they were more like street addresses than trademarks. Federal 
trademark law in the United States and Greece allow concurrent use of the 
same mark by others, as long as such use is not likely to cause confusion or 
to cause mistake or to deceive. Another problem that arises is that names that 
could not be registered or protected as trademarks nonetheless receive a 
perpetual monopoly as domain names. Furthermore, trademarks that consist 
of “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” or that are primarily 
geographically descriptive or primarily surnames are not capable of being 
registered. Therefore, marks must be distinctive in order to be registered. 
Marks that consist of coined words or arbitrary uses of language that are 
arbitrary or fanciful are considered to be inherently distinctive, and so marks 
that require mental imagination, thought and perception to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of goods are suggestive and also inherently 
distinctive. On the other hand, marks that are merely descriptive or generic 
are not capable of becoming trademarks. Although descriptive terms can 
attain secondary meaning through use and advertising, and so become 
distinctive and registration-worthy, generic terms, such as the common 
descriptive term for the genus of a product or service, are never distinctive 
and cannot get protection as trademarks. The purpose of the distinctiveness 
requirement is to keep common words and phrases in the public domain, in 
order to ensure a competitive marketplace. Trademark laws now protect 
descriptive terms that have become distinctive through the secondary 
meaning principle.221 
The merger of trademark law with Internet domain names indicates that 
borrowing concepts in law is the basic instrument of developing the law. The 
distinctive aspects of trademark use in cyberspace have led companies to 
 
 221.  Lisa P. Ramsey & Jens Schovsbo, Mechanisms for Limiting Trade Mark Rights to Further 
Competition and Free Speech, 44 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L., 671 (2013) (such as “Fish-
Fri”). 
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adopt strategies to get the most value from their trademarks. The most 
common method of locating an unknown domain name is merely to type in 
the company name or logo with the suffix “.com.” Companies prefer their 
domain name to be comprised of the company or brand trademark, and the 
suffix “.com.”222 Trademarks are used in e-commerce in a variety of ways. 
A trademark could be used as part of the domain name of a website, or on 
the face of a web page and in the metatags of a web page. 
Cyberpiracy and cybersquatting are the two activities threatening 
companies by utilizing their trademarks as domain names. Cyberpirates 
acquire domain names in order to switch customers from a trademark 
owner’s site to their own, allowing them to profit off the mark’s goodwill 
and benefit by either confusing customers as to the source of the goods or 
services sold, or by generating advertising revenue from the additional 
customers. Revenue on the web is still driven mainly by advertising, and 
advertising is based on traffic hits to the site, rather than sales from the site. 
Cyberpirates seek to attract this traffic by registering domains names that are 
identical or similar to popular trademarks. A cybersquatter is a person who 
knowingly reserves a trademark as a domain name simply to sell it for a 
profit. Companies often prefer to pay off cybersquatters rather than pursue  
lawsuits against them.223 
Predominantly with regard to the phenomenon of cybersquatting, 
traditional trademark law was clearly unable to cope with the new 
challenges.224 Courts relied on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(“FTDA”) as the tool of choice in combating cybersquatters. However, the 
FTDA only protects famous marks, and thus does not provide any protection 
to “ordinary” trademark owners.225 The FTDA requires trademark use by the 
defendant of the allegedly infringing term, which is not met where a 
cybersquatter simply and passively holds a domain name without connecting 
it to a website. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(“ACPA”) enables trademark owners to recover domain names 
incorporating terms identical to, or similar to, the plaintiffs’ marks from 
 
 222.  Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 223.  Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 304 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 224.  Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1228–29 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision Int’l, L.P. 
v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 225.  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting that for famous 
trademarks, the federal trademark dilution law extends protection against subsequent uses that blur or 
tarnish the distinctiveness of the famous trademark, even absent a likelihood of confusion). 
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parties who have registered such domain names in bad faith.226 Internet 
domain name disputes focus on protecting holders of trademarks from bad-
faith registrations and uses of domain names that correspond to relevant 
trademark interests. 
D.  Trademarks and Territoriality 
Trademark law is territorial since the initial IP conventions of the late 
nineteenth century, the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, were given national treatment.227 
A signatory state was obliged to offer protection to nationals of other 
signatory states that matched the protection afforded its own nationals. Law 
is contextual, and geography is a central part of context. Trademark rights 
have been defined territorially. Trademark rights that have been defined 
territorially flowed logically from the intrinsic purpose of trademark law. 
Whether viewed as an instrument to safeguard producer goodwill, or to 
protect consumers against confusion, the purpose of trademark law was 
served by recognizing rights in the local producer.228 
Territoriality reflects efforts to protect goodwill to the extent of its 
geographic reach. On the other hand, global markets and digital 
communication have encouraged a need for more effective international 
enforcement of rights and the motivation of cross-border trade. Trademarks 
function as badges of origin by designating the source of goods or services 
to the consumer. As a result, trademark rights preclude others from taking 
advantage of the reputation associated with a trademark and diverting trade 
away from the trademark owner’s selling.229 
According to article 6 of the EU Directive, the scope of the territorial 
right is limited in order to preserve its essential function of a trademark.230 
 
 226.  Cable News Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 523 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 56 
Fed. Appx. 599, 600 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 227.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 31; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 228.  Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 
732, 733 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the right of the junior user nationally to exclude the senior user 
from the local area in which the junior user was the first to use). 
 229.  Case T-79/00, Rewe-Zentral v. OHIM (LITE), 2002 E.C.R. II-717; Case T-128/01, Daimler-
Chrysler Corp. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-711; First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 
to Approximate to the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, art. 5(1)–(2), 1989 O.J. (L 
40/1). 
 230.  Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed 2002 E.C.R. I-10291; Case T-
130/01, Sykes Enterprises Inc. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-5187. 
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The boundaries of trademark law have been delineated in part by reference 
to physical geography. However, in cyberspace, apparent spatial boundaries 
are collapsed because, as a technological matter, there can be only one 
diavlos.com domain name, and it can only point to one firm.231 The court in 
Panavision Int’l v Toeppen expanded the geographical reach of trademark 
law with regard to domain names.232 As a result, applying trademark law to 
domain names has resulted in trademark law becoming unmoored to physical 
geography, and is more likely  to operate extra-territorially. Parties claiming 
ownership in a mark could sue in a different country, and due to differences 
in substantive law, each party could win. As a result, enforcement becomes 
a problem as trademark law grows in scope in cyberspace.233 The ACPA 
provides in rem jurisdiction over the domain name wherever that name is 
registered by creating assertions of jurisdiction. The question is whether they 
comport with Constitutional Due Process guarantees.234 Congress cannot 
avoid the constitutional requirements of fair play and substantial justice 
purely by calling an action in rem, and by limiting recovery to the res itself.235 
As first described in Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics 
Corp., the factors taken into consideration in determining whether a 
likelihood of  confusion exists between two marks are: the strength of the 
mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the 
products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual 
 
 231.  United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101 (1918) (“[W]here two parties 
independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly 
remote from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant.”). 
 232.  Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Panavision Int’l v. 
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996)); Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 
(2012); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 106-479 § 3002 (1999) (providing an explicit Federal remedy to combat so-called “cybersquatting”). 
 233.  Mecklermedia Corp. v. DC Congress GmbH [1998] 1 All E.R. 148, 160 (reaching a different 
conclusion on ownership of a mark from the one reached in other countries). 
 234.  Fleetboston Financial Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D. Mass. 
2001) (finding that in rem provisions of the ACPA violate due process when the domain name registration 
paper is subsequently transferred to a district other than the district where the registrar is located); 
Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 865–66 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that 
the registration of a domain name, without more, cannot be sufficient minimum contacts for the purposes 
of in personam jurisdiction); America Online, Inc. v. Chih-Hsien Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859–60 
(E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that filing an online domain name registration agreement with Network 
Solutions is not sufficient contact with Virginia to justify in personam jurisdiction); Caesars World, Inc. 
v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding sufficient contacts for purposes 
of in rem jurisdiction); Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 531 n.5 (E.D. 
Va. 2000) (finding that registration is sufficient minimum contact for in personam jurisdiction). 
 235.  Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000) 
(“[U]nder Shaffer, there must be minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in those in rem 
proceedings where the underlying cause of action is unrelated to the property which is located in the 
forum state.”). 
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confusion, the reciprocal of the defendant’s good faith in adopting its own 
mark, the quality of the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the 
buyers are.236 Protecting famous trademarks constitutes a vital purpose in IP 
law, stemming from the broader international thrust purporting to enshrine 
and protect well-known marks.237 Safeguarding well-known marks is 
important, along with concurrently generating disincentives for 
manufacturers to intrude upon famous marks. Well-known marks will often 
become household brand names and may be sold, licensed, or assigned by 
legitimate owners of the mark for considerable financial gain. To that extent, 
domain names have become the priceless intangible real estate of 
cyberspace. A trademark has to be used for selling a product or service. The 
present legal framework tolerates comparative advertising by allowing for a 
comparison of products when the objective is to inform the end-user of the 
differences between similar products.238 
Traditionally, trademark law is designed for minimizing consumer 
search costs, and the basic doctrinal structure of attenuated, perception-based 
rights must be preserved. Traditional trademark law—in contrast to 
trademark dilution law—possesses “a built-in First Amendment compass,” 
making it “wholly consistent with the theory of the First Amendment, which 
does not protect commercial fraud.”239 Distinctiveness and confusion are the 
two terms in which courts have developed their views regarding the 
protection and use of trademarks. The importance of consumer protection 
cannot be over-emphasized, and the average consumer standard should 
remain the central point of the inquiry, even during under domain name 
litigation. 
 
 236.  287 F.2d 492, 495 (2nd Cir. 1962); see also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 
939–40 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 237.  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305. 
 238.  Trade-marks Act R.S.C., ch. T-13, 11.16(2)–(3) (1985). 
 239.  Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002); Playboy Enters. v. 
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a search engine could be 
liable for initial confusion created by banner advertisement appearing on search results page); Google 
Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1393 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing 
infringement case to go forward against the search engine for selling advertisements on website keyed to 
trademarked terms). 
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IV.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
A.  Data and Methodology 
All the national laws in force by the end of 2012 of the seventy-nine 
investigated jurisdictions have been examined and used in the ranking of the 
various factors when constructing ZEKIPR6 index.240 Therefore, all future 
changes to intellectual property laws and their enforcement will continue to 
alter our indices. Therefore, the IPRs’ index will be continuously updated. 
Furthermore, sub-indices for the protection of the individual intellectual 
property rights, such as patents, copyright and trademarks can be obtained 
by the national laws of the investigated countries by taking only the national 
law plus the enforcement legal rating into account. The following indices are 
used: 
 
ZEKIPR6= Membership in International Treaties + INDEX OF 
PATENT RIGHTS + INDEX OF COPYRIGHT+ INDEX OF 
TRADE-MARK RIGHTS + Enforcement legal rating (Legal 
Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal Education+ Economic level) 
 
Zekcopy6= INDEX OF COPYRIGHT+ Enforcement legal rating (Legal 
Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal Education+ Economic level) 
 
Zekmark6= INDEX OF TRADE-MARK RIGHTS + Enforcement legal 
rating (Legal Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal Education+ Economic 
level) 
 
Enforcement legal rating (Legal Tradition (Rule of law) + Legal 
Education+ Economic level) is made according to this author’s evaluation. 
The following graphs illustrate the prices of zekmark6 & zekcopy6: 
 
 
 240.  GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, IPRS PROTECTION AND THEIR IMPACT UPON FDI, GDP GROWTH AND 
TRADE (2013). 
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Graph 2: Two-Way Histogram zekcopy6 
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where, for the ith case, Yi is the response variable,  are p 
regressors, and  is a mean zero error  term. The quantities are unknown 
coefficients, whose values are determined by least squares. 
In detail, the following are the econometric models that are used in our 
investigation to find the impact of IPRs and GCI upon attracting FDI inflows: 
 
FDIit= b0 + b1 Zekcopy6it + b2 GDPit+ b3 Tradeit+b4 Inflationit + uit  (1) 
 
FDIit= b0 + b1 GCIit + b2 GDPit+ b3Tradeit+b4 Inflationit + uit (2) 
 
FDIit= b0 + b1 Zekmark6it + b2 GDPit+ b3 Tradeit+b4 Inflationit + uit (3) 
 
The first thing to notice is the two subscripts: one denotes the ith individual 
country, and the second, t, denotes the tth time period. The analysis is focused on 
FDI inflows. FDI inflows FDIin2012-=US Dollars at current prices and current 
exchange rates in millions, 2012 UNCTADstat, b0 is the intercept, and (GDP GR 
2012 = GDP growth (annual %) 2012 World Bank, INF2012= Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual %), 2012 World Bank, TRADE2012= Trade (% of GDP), 2012 World 
Bank, GCI. The Global Competitiveness Index in 2011–12 (GCI) are the 
explanatory variables. 
B.  Empirical Results 
We start with correlating the variables utilized in our econometric models in 
order to avoid multicollinearity: 
 
 
The analysis of the data utilizing our econometric models gives the following 
results: 
1.  FDI Inflows OLS Model 1/ Model 3 Beta Coefficients 
We start our investigation with Model 1 by using OLS standardized 
coefficients, or beta coefficients. The results (Coef. 5.70***, 5.77***, 6.50***) 
show the significance of zekcopy6 in 2012 for the five- and ten-years reference for 
foreign direct investment, net inflows U.S. Dollars at current prices and current 
exchange rates in millions, according to 2012 UNCTADstat (Table 1). It is worth 
       gci12     0.8216   0.8368   0.4169   0.4371  -0.2474  -0.5375   1.0000
     inf2012    -0.4506  -0.4927  -0.1406  -0.2268   0.2879   1.0000
   gdpgr2012    -0.4992  -0.5126  -0.2538  -0.0850   1.0000
   trade2012     0.2377   0.2501  -0.2145   1.0000
     gdp2012     0.4423   0.4291   1.0000
    zekmark6     0.9843   1.0000
    zekcopy6     1.0000
                                                                             
               zekcopy6 zekmark6  gdp2012 tra~2012 gdpgr2~2  inf2012    gci12
(obs=55)
. corr  zekcopy6 zekmark6 gdp2012 trade2012 gdpgr2012 inf2012 gci12
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mentioning here that the zekcopy6 beta regarding FDI inflows are 0.6664939, 
0.6750876 and 0.7339297, respectively. 
We continue our investigation with Model 3, by using OLS standardized 
coefficients or beta coefficients. The results (Coef. 5.82***, 6.12***, 6.66***) show 
the significance of zekmark6 in 2012 for the five- and ten-years reference for foreign 
direct investment, net inflows U.S. Dollars at current prices and current exchange 
rates in millions, according to 2012 UNCTADstat (Table 1). Here the zekmark6 beta 
regarding FDI inflows are 0.6839728, 0.7247498 and 0.7592528, respectively. 
 
Table 1: FDI Inflows OLS Model 1/ Model 3 Beta Coefficients 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
The following avplots (graphs an added-variable plot, a.k.a. partial regression 










































-0.45 -0.47 -1.77 -0.67 -1.08 -2.04
(2.023) (1.981) (1.685) (2.093) (2.028) (1.691)
Observations 52 76 79 52 76 79
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.45 0.35 0.37 0.45
Adj. R-
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Graph 3: reg logfdiin2012  zekmark6  gdpgr2012 trade2012 inf2012,beta 
 
 
Graph 4: reg  logfdiin2012  zekcopy6  gdpgr2012 trade2012 inf2012,beta 
 
 
2.  FDI inflows OLS Model 2 beta coefficients 
We carry on our investigation with model 2 using OLS standardized 
coefficients or beta coefficients. The results (Coef. 2.06***, 1.82***, 1.87***) show 
the significance of gci in 2012. The five and ten years reference for Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows of U.S. Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates 
in millions, according to 2012 UNCTADstat are also measured. It is worth 
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coef = .01304282, se = .05397518, t = .24
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Copyright laws must expand as technology develops, in order to have an 
adequate balance between private rights and public interests. One of the most 
challenged issues in the field of intellectual property law is the level to which legally 
created rights may be restraining, rather than encouraging, scientific research. 
Although IP rights are intended to promote scientific progress, over proliferation or 
distortion of an optimal arrangement of rights generates bottlenecks that hamper the 
flow of research. 
The above analysis of copyright and trademark law allows us to understand IP 
rights while preparing our own IP rights indices.241 Moreover, the constant 
development of the legal regulation and enforcement of IP rights, results in a nonstop 
alteration of an index regarding copyright and trademark protection. The brief 
econometric analysis further shows the significance of zekcopy6 and zekmark6, and 
the competitiveness in attracting FDI inflows. Finally, the analysis of the legal 
background of copyright and trademark law shows a continuous development of the 
legal regulation and enforcement of IP rights. Therefore, there is a need for 
continuous alteration of an index (zekcopy6- zekmark6) regarding the protection of 
copyrights, trademarks and IP rights. 
Copyright law must advance the creation, dissemination, and preservation of 
works that are valuable to society, expressed not only by traditional means but also 
by electronic means. Developing digital goods and services makes the introduction 
of electronic trademarks necessary. The current legal environment does not tender 
sufficient protection in the changing technological environment, but there is a need 
to support technological advancement while protecting users’ data and interests. 
Presently, technology is changing in a faster rhythm than the law, and this failure 
translates into IPRs regulation. In the cyberspace and globalization era, copyright 
regulation is not effective in complying with the needs of creators and society. As a 
result, creators will have no motivation to create. The development of e-trademarks 
demands an effective electronic international trademarks regulation. Of course, to 
some extent, conventional trademarks laws are applicable to e-trademarks as well. 
The territoriality of trademarks would transform into cyber-territoriality for cyber-
trademarks affixed to cyber-goods and services. Therefore, a system of electronic IP 





 241.  GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IPRS (2016). 
